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The Compromise Between Outrage and
Compassion: Article 3(a) and In re
Requested Extradition of Smyth
Daniel T. Kiely, Jr.*
Introduction
The 1986 ratification of a supplementary extradition treaty between the
United States and the United Kingdom' marked a significant departure
from established extradition law in the United States. The Supplementary
Treaty was promulgated in response to four federal court decisions in the
early 1980s refusing to extradite members of the Provisional Irish Republi-
can Army (P.I.R.A.) to the United Kingdom. 2 In each case, the P.I.R.A. fugi-
tives were deemed to be non-extraditable after the court concluded that the
"4political offense" exception barred their extradition.3 This exception is
codified in all bilateral extradition treaties to which the United States is a
party and grants U.S. courts the power to refuse a foreign nation's request
for extradition if the court finds that the offense committed by the potential
extraditee was political in nature.4 The 1985 Supplementary Treaty
between the United States and Great Britain significantly narrowed the
political offense exception by explicitly excluding most violent crimes from
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1. Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between the Govern-
ment of the Unites States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 25, 1985 [hereinafter Supplementary Treaty].
The text of this treaty can be found at S. ExEc. REP. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17
(1986).
2. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp.
270, 277 (S.D. N.Y. 1984), affid, 943 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 502 U.S. 314
(1992); In re McMullen, Mag. No. 3-78-1099 MG, slip op. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979);
Quinn v. Robinson, No. C-82-6688 RPA, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1983), rev'd, 783 F.2d
776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986).
3. Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Oct. 21, 1976, art. V(1)(c)(i),
U.S.-U.K, 28 U.S.T. 227 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty]. This provision of the treaty
states that extradition "shall not be granted" in cases where the offense "is regarded by
the requested party as one of a political character."
4. See John Patrick Groarke, Comment, Revolutionaries Beware: The Erosion of the
Political Offense Exception Under the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Supplementary
Extradition Treaty, 136 U. PA. L. Rev. 1515, 1519 (1988).
30 Comtnt. Ir't. J. 587 (1997)
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the definition of "political crime. ' 5
Although the Supplementary Treaty effectively denies P.I.R.A. fugitives
a defense predicated upon the political offense exception, it does provide
for a new, more narrow, defense to extradition. This new defense is codi-
fied in article 3(a) of the Supplementary Treaty.6 Article 3(a) provides
potential extraditees with a defense to extradition based upon racial, reli-
gious, political, or ethnic discrimination. Under article 3(a), a U.S. court
may deny extradition in two situations: (1) if the request for extradition is
motivated by a subjective desire to punish the person sought on account of
his or her race, religion, nationality, or political opinions; or (2) in situa-
tions where the person sought would in fact be prejudiced at his or her
trial, or prejudiced after his or her trial on account of the forbidden
factors.7
Until 1994, no P.I.R.A. fugitive had asserted an article 3(a) defense to
extradition. In In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California held that James Smyth, a suspected
P.I.R.A. fugitive who had escaped from prison in Northern Ireland after
serving five years of a twenty-year sentence for attempted murder, asserted
a meritorious article 3(a) defense to extradition. 8 The court held that
Smyth had established this claim by showing that he would be punished
both because of his religion and because of his political opinions upon his
5. Article 1 of the Treaty states:
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following shall be
regarded as an offense of a political character:
(a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have the obligation pursuant
to a multilateral international agreement to extradite the person sought or to
submit his case to their competent authorities for decision as to prosecution;
(b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily
harm;
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including taking a
hostage;
(d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or
parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if this use endangers any person;
(e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or participation as an
accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offense.
Supplementary Treaty, supra note 1, at 15.
6. Article 3(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplementary Treaty, extradition
shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of the compe-
tent judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request for
extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on account of
his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, or that he would, if surren-
dered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his liberty
by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions.
Supplementary Treaty, supra note 1, at 16.
7. See In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1150 (N.D. Cal.
1994), rev'd 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996). The Smyth court noted that Article 3(a) granted
two distinct powers: (1) the court may inquire into whether the requesting nation has
"trumped up" charges against the fugitive; and (2) the court may inquire into whether
the fugitive would be unfairly treated at his trial or punished, detained, or restricted in
his liberty because of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. Id.
8. Id. at 1151.
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return to prison in Northern Ireland and upon his subsequent release into
the general populationY Judge Barbara Caulfield arrived at this conclusion
by relying upon presumptions awarded to James Smyth that were not
rebutted by Great Britain and by using an analogous immigration provi-
sion called "withholding of deportation" to interpret article 3(a). 10
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the Northern
District's findings and ordered the Northern District to certify the extradi-
tion request.11 In addition to holding that the presumptions awarded to
James Smyth were inappropriate, the Ninth Circuit also rejected Judge
Caulfield's use of the withholding of deportation statute and regulations.'
2
The Supreme Court implicitly upheld the decision of the Ninth Circuit by
refusing to hear Smyth's appeal.13
This Note explores the Smyth case in an effort to determine the proper
scope of article 3(a) of the Supplementary Treaty. This Note does not seek
to determine the relative merits of Mr. Smyth's article 3(a) claim. Rather, it
critiques the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of that provision.
Part I discusses the historical roots of the Anglo-Irish relationship and
the causes of the current conflict. Part I also discusses the judicial system
that has been established in Northern Ireland in response to the political
unrest there. Part II examines the 1986 Supplementary Treaty and its pred-
ecessor, the 1977 Treaty. Part III looks at the background of James Smyth
and the circumstances surrounding his trial and appeals in U.S. federal
courts. Finally, part IV analyzes the holdings of the federal courts that
heard Smyth and offers suggestions regarding the future interpretation and
application of article 3(a).
I. Background
A. History of the Conflict and the Beginning of British Rule
Irish historian Robert Kee once noted that when trouble began to escalate
in Northern Ireland in the 1960s it took many people by surprise. Many
people throughout the world thought that these problems signalled the
beginning of unrest. However, these problems were not a beginning, but
rather were "the latest events in an age old story which began long ago."' 4
To understand the violence that permeates Northern Ireland today it is
necessary to understand the roots of the Anglo-Irish conflict. The Anglo-
Irish saga dates back to the Norman Conquest of Ireland in 1170 when
King Henry II succeeded in capturing Dublin and the surrounding area. 15
For the next 800 years, London exerted great influence over the lives of the
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1152.
11. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 722 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
12. Id. at 720.
13. Smyth v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 2258 (1996).
14. ROBERT KEE, IRAND: A HISTORY 15 (1982).
15. See T.W. MOODY & F.X. MARTIN, THE COURSE OF IRISH HISTORY (1987) (offering a
comprehensive history of Ireland from prehistoric times through 1982).
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Irish people.1 6 The relationship that developed was not an amicable one,
despite its longevity. The generations have been witness to countless Irish-
men employing violence in vain attempts to recapture control of the
island.1 7
B. Independence and Partition
The periodic insurrections which punctuated the English domination of
Ireland were typically no more than sporadic expressions of Irish anger.
These armed rebellions never posed a serious threat to British rule. How-
ever, these attempts were slightly more successful in the years following the
Great Famine. 18 In 1848, at the height of the famine's devastation, a small
group of men attempted to incite an armed rebellion against British rule.19
Although the uprising amounted to little more than a glorified riot, the
spirit of this revolt inspired others and led to the creation of the Fenian
movement, a movement that eventually culminated in the establishment of
the Irish Free State.
Despite increasing support among the population, the citizenry was
not completely unified in its desire for independence from England. There
were deep differences of opinion between the typically wealthy Protestant
minority who supported the union with England and the typically poor
Catholic majority who felt oppressed by British control.20 The socio-eco-
nomic division, more so than the religious division, was largely responsible
for this difference of opinion. The wealthy upper-class enjoyed the stability
of British control and liked to think of themselves as British citizens. Con-
versely, the peasants and lower class felt both socially and economically
oppressed by the British government. 2 1
The establishment of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, or Fenian
organization, on St. Patrick's Day of 1858, represented the rising desire for
independence. 22 The Fenians, who drew their numbers primarily from
working class Catholics, believed that armed confrontation was the only
way in which Ireland could assert its independence from Britain. 23 The
Fenians had a large base of support among Irish persons both in Ireland
and overseas. 24 In addition to the Irish who survived the Great Famine, the
Fenians enlisted the aid of Irish migr~s in the United States and elsewhere
16. See CONOR C. O'BRIEN, THE SIEGE: THE SAGA OF ISRAML AND ZIONISM 329 (1986)
(noting that medieval British rule wrought little oppression upon the Irish. It was not
until the 16th century that the Irish were oppressed by the British).
17. See KEE, supra note 14; MOODY & MARTIN, supra note 15.
18. The Great Famine, 1845-49, was one of the most horrible experiences in the
history of Ireland. During the 5 year potato blight almost 1 million people died from
starvation and disease, and another 1.5 million were forced to emigrate. KEE, supra note
14, at 77-103.
19. Id. at 104-06.
20. See MOODY & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 276.
21. See KEE, supra note 14, at 137-51.
22. See F.S.L. LYONS, IRELAND SINCE THE FAMINE 114 (1971);JosEPH MARONEY CURRAN,
THE BIRTH OF THE IRISH FREE STATE 1921-1923, at 3-4 (1980); KEE, supra note 14, at 107.
23. See MOODY & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 278.
24. Id. at 279.
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who had left during the famine. In 1867, the Fenians struck Like the
numerous uprisings that had occurred since 1170, this insurrection posed
no serious threat to British control. Nevertheless, the 1867 uprising did
have a lasting impact on the people of Ireland and the way in which they
viewed the Anglo-Irish relationship. Although soundly defeated in 1867,
the Fenians continued to work for independence. Their efforts were a sub-
stantial cause of the Anglo-Irish War which ultimately led to the creation of
the Irish Free State.
In 1916, when England and the rest of the world were focused on
mainland Europe and the devastation of World War I, the Fenians struck
again.25 On Easter morning, almost 1600 Irishmen attacked various Brit-
ish targets in Dublin, prompting a swift and severe reaction by the occupy-
ing British military.26 The fighting continued for almost a week before the
heavily outnumbered Fenian forces finally surrendered. Many historians
believe that this rebellion would likely have warranted no more than a his-
torical footnote if it were not for the British government's retaliation against
the rebels. 27
The mounting desire for independence which followed the Easter
Rebellion eventually manifested itself in the Anglo-Irish War of 1919-1921.
In December 1920, in response to the war, the British government formally
and unilaterally partitioned Ireland. The British government, through the
Government of Ireland Act ("GIA), established two Irish parliaments. One
parliament was established in the North to govern six of the nine counties
in the province of Ulster. The other parliament was established to govern
the remaining twenty-six counties in Ireland. The six northern counties,
comprised primarily of Protestant loyalists, quickly established a parlia-
ment, but the southern counties continued to fight for their
independence. 28
The guerrilla tactics of the rebel forces eventually drove the English to
negotiate. In December of 1921 the British government invited the rebel
leaders to London to negotiate a cease-fire. After extensive negotiations,
the Irish representatives were given an ultimatim: either sign an agreement
25. See F.S.L. LYONs, CULTuRE AN ADANARcHY N IRAND 1890-1939, at 85-86 (1979)
(noting that the principal leaders of the Easter Rebellion saw themselves as heirs to the
Fenian tradition); CuRAN, supra note 22, at 10-13.
26. See CuRRAN, supra note 22, at 10-13 (providing an excellent overview of the
Easter Rebellion).
27. See JJ. LEE, IRELAND, 1912-1985: Porncs AND Socmxar 28-38 (1989). Lee notes
that it is widely believed that the majority of the Irish population were, at first, opposed
to the Easter Rebellion but that after the mass executions of the unsuccessful rebels,
public opinion turned against the British. According to Lee, this popular understanding
of the Easter Rebellion has always been accepted as true but rarely subjected to academic
scrutiny. Lee notes the fact that many rumors circulated that may account for the origi-
nal antipathy toward the rebellion. Many people believed that the rebels were part of a
communist plot to invade Ireland or a precursor to a German invasion. He asserts that
public opinion may have been shaped more by these widely disseminated rumors rather
than any real antipathy towards the attempt to break free from English control. Id.
28. Id. at 43.
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or be attacked by the full force of the British military in three days. 29 A
treaty, commonly known as "The Treaty," was subsequently signed in early
December of 1921. It granted internal sovereignty to the twenty-six south-
ern counties in return for their acceptance of partition of the six northern
counties. As a result of The Treaty, the Irish Free State was created. The
nation, comprised of the twenty-six counties, was and remains overwhelm-
ingly Catholic. The six northern counties, composed primarily of Protes-
tants, opted out of the Irish Free State. They chose to remain a part of the
United Kingdom and were allowed to maintain their own local
government. 30
The Treaty proved unacceptable to many Irish rebels who insisted on a
united republic. This group, known as "republicans," rejected the treaty
and those fellow Irishmen who had embraced it. Ultimately, this led to the
civil war of 1922-1923, in which the republicans were defeated. 31 In 1925,
the Irish Free State, Northern Ireland, and England signed a boundary
agreement that settled a dispute over the precise location of the boundary
between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State, s6lidifying the partition
of north and south that is still in place today.32
C. Reawakening of the Troubles in the North
The partition of the island did little to quell Irish unrest and the continuing
calls for unification and an end to British domination. From the very out-
set, violence erupted in Northern Ireland between the Protestant majority
and the Catholic minority.33 Commentators have noted that the demo-
cratic system established in Northern Ireland was patterned on the West-
minster style of democracy, but was never practiced in the same manner. 34
In 1922, the British attempted to calm the situation when they passed the
Special Powers Act.35 The Act imposed severe restrictions upon the per-
sonal liberties of citizens living in Northern Ireland. The Act did not on its
face single out Catholics for persecution, but it was applied in a discrimina-
tory manner.36
29. Id. at 50.
30. See MOODY & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 311-12.
31. See KEE, supra note 14, at 191.
32. See MOODY & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 315; KEE, supra note 14, at 202.
33. See KEE, supra note 14, at 226 (the riots of 1922 in Belfast resulted in 232 deaths,
mostly of Catholics, and encouraged thousands more to leave their homes and migrate
to the Republic of Ireland).
34. See DERMOT PJ. WALSH, THE USE AND ABUSE OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN NORTH.
ERN IRELAND 8 (1983) (noting that the polarization between the Catholics and Protes-
tants ensured that the Protestants would use their majority position to reinforce their
power in Northern Ireland).
35. See id. at 23-24 (noting that the Special Powers Act invested the security forces
with unprecedented powers ostensibly for the purpose of maintaining order); LAwYeRs
COMMITrEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
THE INTIMIDATION OF DEFENSE LAWYERS 17-18 (1993) [hereinafter LAwYERs COMMITTEE
REPORT].
36. See WALSH, supra note 34, at 23-24.
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Over the next forty years, polarization along religious lines ensured
that Northern Ireland remained in turmoil. The situation was exacerbated
when the Catholic minority in the North complained bitterly about what
they perceived as discrimination in employment, housing, and voting.
37
Their protests led to the creation in 1967 of the Northern Ireland Civil
Rights Association (NICRA), an organization patterned after the organiza-
tions that formed during the U.S. civil rights movement. 38 NICRA organ-
ized peaceful marches and demonstrations that were designed mainly to
protest the discriminatory treatment of Catholics in the North, not to pro-
test the existence of Northern Ireland. Extremist Protestants and the police
responded to NICRA's demonstrations with force, thus propelling the
North into greater disorder. In response, the North requested the presence
of British troops in an attempt to restore some semblance of order.39 At
first, many Catholics regarded the arrival of troops as a victory against
Protestant aggression and as a source of protection from the local police.
40
This belief quickly dissipated as Catholic protesters and British troops
clashed in the major cities of Belfast and Derry.41 As a result of these
clashes, the slow pace of reform, and the ineffectiveness of NICRA, the mili-
tant Irish Republican Army reemerged.42
Since the initial partition of Ireland, the I.R.A. had sought the unifica-
tion of Ireland through violent means. In 1962, however, it abandoned
violence as a means of achieving its goals, and shifted its focus to political
and social activities. 43 However, the escalating violence in Northern Ire-
land during the 1960s caused a split in the traditional I.R.A. Many mem-
bers sought a return to their violent roots, while other members
championed the continued use of social and political outreach. In 1970,
the I.R.A split into two factions: the "official" I.R.A, which continued to
advocate social and political solutions to the turmoil; and the "provisional"
I.LA (P.I.R.A.) which supported the use of force as a means of achieving
reunification.44 The P.I.RA. immediately reverted to the violent tactics
that the official I.R.A. had disavowed in 1962, targeting soldiers, police
officers, and prominent Protestant extremists in Northern Ireland for
attack. Later, in an effort to exert greater pressure on England, the P.I.R.A.
began to conduct many of its violent activities within England. The emer-
gence of the P.I.R.A. severely limited the prospects for a peaceful resolution
to the problems of discrimination and oppression in Northern Ireland. In
1972, the P.I.R.A. increased the number of attacks on British targets. The
British military responded by increasing its own activities. On January 31,
37. See LAWYERS COMmWIEE REPORT, supra note 35, at 14-15; WALSH, supra note 34,
at 8-9.
38. See KEE, supra note 14, at 235; MoODY & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 344.
39. See MOODY & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 344.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 346.
42. See M.LR. SMrrH, FIGHTING FOR IRELAND? THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE IRISH
REPUBLICAN MovEmErr 72-87 (1995).
43. See id. at 87; LEE, supra note 27, at 432-33.
44. See SMm!, supra note 42, at 91.
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in one of the most horrible confrontations of the conflict, commonly
known as "Bloody Sunday," a British parachute regiment shot and killed
thirteen unarmed demonstrators taking part.in a banned, but peaceful,
civil rights march in Londonderry. 45 The P.I.R.A. responded with equally
appalling attacks. 46 In an attempt to quell the rapidly escalating violence,
the British government suspended Northern Ireland's parliament and insti-
tuted direct rule from London.47
In 1973, the Irish and British governments made a final attempt to
defuse the situation. That final attempt was embodied in the Sunningdale
Agreement of December 9, 1973. The Agreement sought a diplomatic and
political resolution of the troubles in the North, calling for greater Catholic
participation in the governance of the North. In it, the Irish government
recognized, for the first time, Northern Ireland's status as part of the
United Kingdom. In return, the British government promised to support
reunification if a majority of Northern Ireland's population voted for
reunification.48 Catholics realized that increased political participation
could inevitably eliminate the discrimination that had racked Northern Ire-
land since the partition. The Protestant community in Northern Ireland
staunchly opposed the Sunningdale Agreement because it facilitated
greater political and economic participation on the part of the Catholic
minority, effectively diminishing their power in Northern Ireland.49 In
1974, a general unionist strike, organized in opposition to the accord,
effectively ended any chance that the Agreement would resolve Northern
Ireland's long-standing political problems.
Since that strike, very little has changed in Northern Ireland. Violence
continues to plague the region. Since British troops were first sent to
Northern Ireland in 1969, the political violence has claimed the lives of
over 3,000 people out of a population of approximately 1,500,000.50 In
addition, over 35,000 people, the majority of whom have been civilians,
have been injured. Over the same time period, over 15,000 people have
been charged with committing terrorist offenses." In a vain attempt to
restore order, the British government has deployed thousands of troops. In
1994, the number of British troops serving in Northern Ireland exceeded
24,000.52
45. See KEE, supra note 14, at 239; SMrrH, supra note 42, at 89.
46. See SMrrH, supra note 42, at 109-10. Among the responses was "Bloody Friday"
when P.I.R.A. members planted twenty-two bombs in the center of Belfast. All twenty-
two bombs exploded within an hour, leading to mass confusion, widespread terror, and
nine deaths.
47. See Kee, supra note 14, at 239; MOODY & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 347.
48. See BRIGID HADFIELD, THE CoNsTITuTiON OF NORTHERN IRELAND 110-17 (1989).
49. See James T. Kelly, The Empire Strikes Back: The Taking of Joe Doherty, 61 FORD-
Hiu L REV. 317, 325-26 (1992).
50. In Re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
rev'd 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1141.
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D. Northern Ireland Today
On December 15, 1993, British Prime MinisterJohn Major and Irish Prime
Minister Albert Reynolds unveiled the Downing Street Declaration, which
excited both great hope and great apprehension about the possibility of a
peaceful resolution to the problems in Northern Ireland.' 3 The Declara-
tion enunciated certain principles that were supposed to pave the way for
peace talks and a possible amicable resolution to the violence.5 4 Some
commentators have asserted that the essence of the Declaration was a quid
pro quo: if the P.I.R.A. renounces violence, then Sinn Fein, the political arm
of the P.I.R.A., would be permitted to participate in negotiations concern-
ing the future of Northern Ireland.55 On August 31, 1994 the P.I.R.A.
promised "a complete cessation of military operations."' 6 This action was
regarded as "the most hopeful step toward peace in Northern Ireland [in]
... twenty-five years."' 7
Despite this great advance towards peace, many in Northern Ireland
were skeptical, and even fearful, that the violence that had raged for the
past twenty-five years would not quickly abate.' 8 Although the P.I.R.A. had
committed itself to a cease-fire, the Protestant militant groups had not.' 9
This was especially disconcerting to the Catholic population because Prot-
estant paramilitary groups had, in recent years, become just as powerful,
and just as vicious, as the P.I.LRA. 60 The early days of the cease-fire proved
to be free from violence, and slowly some of the initial fears and skepticism
began to subside.61 The prospects for peace increased when the Combined
Loyalist Military Command, an organization that speaks on behalf of the
Protestant paramilitary organizations, released a statement that suggested
that they too were receptive to the idea of abandoning violence.6 2 The Prot-
estant militants followed these peace overtures with their own cease-fire on
October 14, 1994.63 This was a momentous occasion in that it marked the
first time "that the heavily armed paramiitaries on both sides of the reli-
53. See SMrrH, supra note 42, at 206-11.
54. See Main Points of Anglo-Irish Declaration on Northern Ireland, AGENCE FRANcE
PRmss, Dec. 15, 1993, News.
55. SeeJohn Darnton, Turning Point: The I.R.A. Cease-Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1994,
at Al.
56. Cease-Fire In Northern Ireland. IR.A's 'Cessation' of Fighting, N.Y. TruAs, Sept. 1,
1994, at A12.
57. John Darnton, End of 'the Troubles'?, N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 1, 1994, at Al.
58. See William E. Schmidt, Day I of I.R.A's Cease-Fire: Hopes Tinged by Skepticism,
N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 2, 1994, at Al.
59. See id.; Darnton, supra note 55.
60. See Schmidt, supra note 58, at A10 (noting that Protestant militias, like the Ulster
Freedom Fighters and the Ulster Volunteers, "have become the equal of the I.RLA. in
mayhem and murder.").
61. See William E. Schmidt, In Belfast, Prosperity Eases Catholic Nationalism, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 6, 1994, at A3 (noting that the fact that the cease-fire seemed to hold led to
"cautious hope" in some areas of Belfast).
62. SeeJohn Darnton, Protestant Militants Weighing Response to ILRA. Cease-Fire, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 1994, at A2.
63. SeeJohn Darnton, Militant Protestants In Truce, Lifting Peace Hopes In Ulster, N.Y.
TwMu, Oct. 14, 1994, at Al.
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gious divide... [had stopped] fighting, not for short-term tactical reasons
but to bring about negotiations and a democratic solution."64
In the weeks following the cease-fire, there were more signs that nego-
tiations and diplomacy would accomplish what twenty-five years of bombs
and bullets had failed to achieve. English Prime Minister John Major
accepted the P.I.R.A. truce as "genuine"65 and as a result, opened an offi-
cial dialogue with Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams.66 Although the British
Government categorized this dialogue with Sinn Fein as "talks about talks,"
rather than as full negotiations, the fact that the British government and the
political arm of the P.I.RIA. would, for the first time, openly discuss the
prospects of peace was a tremendous advance towards a peaceful resolu-
tion of the troubles.67 After opening the dialogue and acknowledging the
legitimacy of the cease-fire, the British government announced that it
would end daytime army patrols in Belfast, the capital of Northern Ire-
land.68 The British government also made small reductions of troops sta-
tioned in Northern Ireland 69 and granted early release to several
incarcerated P.I.R.A. members. 70
Despite these encouraging signs, the peace process moved forward
very slowly and at times seemed to be on the verge of collapse. In July
1995, civil unrest reached its highest levels since the P.I.R.A. had declared a
cease-fire ten months earlier. 71 Violent protests, which lasted for two
nights, erupted in Catholic areas of Belfast after the release of a British
soldier who had been sentenced to life in prison for the 1990 murder of a
seventeen year old Catholic girl.72 The riots, punctuated by vandalism,
firebombing of cars, and "general disorder," led to thirty-two arrests but no
serious injuries. Significantly, the P.I.R.A. did not abandon the cease-
fire.73 One week later, Protestant groups in Ulster rioted after the police
refused to allow them to march through a Roman Catholic area to com-
memorate the Battle of the Boyne, the 1690 event that established Protes-
tant domination of Northern Ireland. 74
The fear that the July riots might derail the peace process proved to be
unfounded. However, the peace efforts had slowed considerably. The pri-
64. Id.
65. John Darnton, Major Accepts I.R.A.'s Truce as Authentic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
1994, at Al.
66. See John Darnton, Britain and the I.R.A. Group to Begin Talks in Northern Ireland,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at A12.
67. Id.
68. SeeJames F. Clarity, Britain To End Daytime Patrols in Belfast, N.Y. TiME,Jan. 13,
1995, at A5.
69. See James F. Clarity, Britain to Pull 400 More Troops Out of Ulster, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 1995, at A5.
70. See Richard W. Stevenson, Britain Offers to Cut Terms for 400 Irish Convicts, N.Y.
TM as, Aug. 26, 1995, at A4.
71. See James F. Clarity, Violence Erupts In Ulster Cities, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1995, at
Al.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See James F. Clarity, Protestants Fight Police in Ulster, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1995,
at All.
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mary reason for this was the refusal of both sides to compromise on the
question of whether disarmament of the P.I.R.A. should be a precursor to
"all-party" talks. 75 The issue of "decommissioning" all of the P.I.R.A.'s
weapons as a precondition to beginning negotiations ground the peace pro-
cess to a halt. The British government insisted that the P.I.R.A. turn over all
of its weapons before beginning negotiations.76 Sinn Fein asserted that it
was "backward thinking... to expect weapons to be surrendered or taken
out of operation before-instead of after-some sort of overall accord."77
This single issue threatened to destroy the P.I.P.A. cease-fire and
return Northern Ireland to the state of war that it had known since 1970.
U.S. President Clinton intervened in November of 1995 to revive the ailing
peace process. His visit to Ireland, England, and Northern Ireland, the first
U.S. Presidential visit to Northern Ireland, seemed to reinvigorate the peace
process.78 Furthermore, his trip to the area "concentrated the mind[s]" of
the concerned parties and led to the formation of an international panel,
led by former United States Senator George Mitchell, to fashion a compro-
mise between Sinn Fein and the British government. 79 On January 23,
1996 the international panel recommended to Britain that it drop its
demand that the P.I.R.A. disarm before Sinn Fein could participate in all-
party peace talks.80 John Major refused to accept the panel's recommenda-
tion.81 Instead, he proposed that Northern Ireland should call elections to
elect members of an assembly that would serve as a "negotiating forum."82
After Major refused to drop his demand for decommissioning of weapons,
it became apparent that P.I.RLA. resolve to maintain the eighteen-month
cease-fire, which had been critical to the peace process, was waning.83
At 7:01 P.M. on February 9, 1996, the P..R.A. abandoned the eighteen-
month cease-fire by detonating a powerful bomb in the financial district of
East London. The blast killed two people, injured 100 more, and caused
more than $100 million worth of damage.8 4 Approximately one hour
before the explosion, an Irish radio station received a statement announc-
ing that "the complete cessation of military operations will end at 6:00
P.M." because "selfish party[,] political and sectional interests in the
75. See James F. Clarity, Gerry Adams Discusses LIRA Arms, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 10,
1995, at A9.
76. See John Darnton, Ulster Danger Point; Dublin Cancels Key Meeting with London
Over British Demand that I.R.A. Disarm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1995, at A6.
77. Id.
78. See R.W. Apple Jr., On A Day of Peace in Belfast, Faiths join to Cheer Clinton, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1995, at Al.
79. See A Break in the Irish Impasse, N.Y. TIMs, Nov. 30, 1995, at A28; James F.
Clarity, Northern Ireland Disarmament Panel Convenes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1995, at A25.
80. See James F. Clarity, International Panel Asks Britain to Ease Terms on LIA at
Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at A5.
81. See James F. Clarity, British Make Offer to Sinn Fein, But It's Conditioned on
Ulster Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at A3.
82. Id.
83. See Kevin Cullen, Gun Issue Hinders Irish Peace Process, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5,
1996, at 9.
84. See Richard W. Stevenson, Bomb Wounds 100 in London as I.R.A. Truce Is Said to
End, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1996, at Al.
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London Parliament have been placed before the rights of the people of Ire-
land."8 5 In the days following the blast, it became clear that the P.I.RA.
was responsible for the bombing and that the attack represented a funda-
mental change in the P.I.R.A.'s policy.86 On February 15, 1996, the P.I.R.A.
placed another bomb in London.8 7 Although the anti-terrorist unit of the
London police force defused the bomb, commentators believe that its
placement was a dear signal that the earlier explosion in East London was
not intended as an isolated incident, but rather highlighted the fact that
"the P.I.R.A. [was] prepared to return to its policy of sustained terrorist
attacks in London."88
Since February 1996, the P.I.R.A. has resumed its use of violence.
With the return of P.I.R.A. violence, many in Northern Ireland have lost
hope that a lasting resolution to the troubles will be found anytime soon.8 9
In fact, the P.I.R.A.'s return to violence has led the British government to
resume the old practice of having troops patrol the streets. 90 Furthermore,
it seems only a matter of time before the Protestant paramilitaries put an
end to their self-imposed cease-fire as well.91 When that happens, the
peace talks, and the hopes of a lasting peace that they engendered, will be
but a memory.
E. Justice in Northern Ireland
In 1973, when the British government instituted direct rule of Northern
Ireland from London, the government feared that, by itself, such direct rule
over Northern Ireland would be insufficient to restore order. In an attempt
to limit the spread of terrorism, the British government enacted several laws
to curtail the civil liberties of its citizens living in Northern Ireland. The
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA) was first enacted in
1973 and has been amended and reenacted several times sihce.92 The Pre-
vention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA) was first enacted in
1974 and has also been amended and reenacted several times over the
years.93 The EPA applies only to Northern Ireland, while the PTA applies
throughout the United Kingdom. 94
85. Id.
86. See Richard W. Stevenson, I.R.A. Issues Claim of Responsibility for London Bomb,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1996, at Al.
87. See Sarah Lyall, I.R.A. Bomb Destroyed in Central London, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1996, at A6.
88. Id.
89. See Ulster's Battered Peace, N.Y. TIMEs, July 16, 1996, at A16.
90. See James F. Clarity, Troops Patrol Belfast Again, Raising the Tension, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 1996, at A4.
91. See James F. Clarity, Belfast Journal; "Like the Bad Old Days" As Fright Revisits
Ulster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1997, at A4.
92. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, ch. 24 [hereinafter EPA].
The first version of the EPA was enacted in 1973. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provi-
sions) Act, 1973, ch. 53.
93. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, ch. 4.
94. See EPA, supra note 92.
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1. Restrictions on Personal Liberty
The EPA and the PTA both permit significant restrictions and abridgments
of personal liberty before and after an individual is or has been charged
with a crime. In theory, the EPA and PTA, by their terms, apply ta all citi-
zens. However, some commentators have asserted that, in practice, the
laws are used primarily to restrict the personal liberties of Catholic citizens
only.95 Under the provisions of the EPA, any constable or British soldier
"9may stop any person for so long as necessary" and demand that the indi-
vidual answer "to the best of his knowledge and ability" any questions the
officer asks.96 The officer does not need reasonable suspicion of a crime
to question the person. Any person who fails to stop and respond is guilty
of a crime and faces imprisonment of up to six months and a fine of up to
four hundred pounds. Additionally, the officer may shoot an individual
who fails to stop at the command of the security forces. 97
Security personnel are also entitled, under the provisions of the EPA,
to arrest, without a warrant, any person whom they suspect is committing,
has committed or is about to commit a terrorist-style offense.98 To facili-
tate the arrest, an officer is empowered to search, without a warrant, any
premises in which he believes the suspect may be hiding.99 Once arrested,
the length of detention varies depending upon who arrested the suspect.
Soldiers are only permitted to detain suspects for four hours, while consta-
bles have the authority to detain a suspect for up to forty-eight hours. This
detention can be extended for an additional five days, if necessary, for a
95. See In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1142-43 (N.D. Cal.
1994), rev'd 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996) (noting the disparate treatment Catholics receive in
Northern Ireland at the hands of the security forces. The court highlighted the fact that
Catholics are arrested and killed by security personnel in staggeringly greater numbers).
96. EPA, supra note 92, § 23.
97. See Kelly D. Talcott, Note, Questions of Justice: U.S. Courts' Powers of Inquiry
Under Article 3(a) of the United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty,
62 NoTRm DAME L. REv. 474, 486 (1987); R.J. Spjut, The "Official" Use of Deadly Force by
the Security Forces Against Suspected Terrorists: Some Lessons From Northern Ireland,
1986 PuB. L. 38, 57-59.
98. EPA, supra note 92, § 18(1). As a point of reference, it might be useful to see
how this compares to the rules in the United States governing arrests. In no way does
this comparison imply that the U.S. system is the benchmark against which all other
systems should be judged. Rather, the comparison highlights the fact that in some
instances the American system of criminal procedure affords no more protection to indi-
viduals suspected of criminal behavior that does the system in Northern Ireland. In
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), the Supreme Court held that arrest war-
rants are not constitutionally required. Id. at 423. The only situation where an arrest
warrant may be constitutionally required is where the police wish to enter private prem-
ises to arrest a suspect. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless entry into a sus-
pect's home for the purpose of making a routine arrest).
99. EPA, supra note 92, at § 18(1). This differs from American criminal procedure
in that it seems likely that an arrest warrant would be required under U.S. law before the
police would be constitutionally authorized to enter a private dwelling to make an arrest.
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total of seven days. 100 Security personnel in Northern Ireland have often
abused this broad authority by arresting and then detaining and interrogat-
ing at great length many persons who are subsequently released without
ever having been formally charged with a crime.10 1
Detainees who are actually accused of terrorist-style offenses under
the EPA are subjected to even greater restrictions on their personal liberties
while they await trial.10 2 For example, in most situations, the EPA all but
ensures that a person charged with a terrorist-style offense will stand little
or no chance of being released on bail prior to trial. The EPA strips magis-
trates and justices of the peace of their power to grant bail in such cases.
Bail is available only by application to a High Court judge.10 3 Further-
more, the EPA shifts the burden of convincing the High Court judge that
bail is warranted to the accused. In the United Kingdom, the burden of
proof in bail hearings is ordinarily on the prosecution. 10 4
In addition to the effective denial of bail, many accused terrorists have
been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in prison.' 05 This
abuse was most profound in 1971 when security personnel employed sen-
sory deprivation techniques developed in colonial disputes in Kenya and
Malaysia to gather information about the I.R.A. 106 In 1971, the Republic of
Ireland filed a complaint with the European Commission on Human Rights
alleging that the interrogation techniques used by the security personnel in
Northern Ireland violated article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.10 7 In 1978, the European Court of Human Rights found that the
techniques employed constituted inhuman and degrading treatment, but
100. See id. at § 14(1); In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1141
(N.D. Cal. 1994), rev'd 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
101. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
rev'd 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996) (noting that over the years, only about 25% of those
persons detained for terrorism-related interrogations are actually charged with a crime.
In 1992, 1,795 persons were arrested for terrorist-related crimes, but only about 400
were charged with a crime. Of the over 1,300 persons arrested and not charged, almost
1,100 were Catholics.).
102. EPA, supra note 92, at §1. Terrorist-style offenses, called scheduled offenses,
include murder, kidnapping, assault, and crimes involving weapons and explosives etc.
103. Id. § 12.
104. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL wITH TER-
RORIST ACTVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, Cmnd. Ser. 5, No. 5185 (Lord Diplock,
Chairman) at 23-24 [hereinafter DIPLOCK REPORT].
105. REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE SECURITY FORCES OF PHYsi-
CAL BRUTALITY ARISING OUT OF EVENTS ON THE 9TH AUGUST 1971, 1971 Cmnd. Ser. 5, No.
4823 (Chairman Sir Edmund Compton). This British government report verified allega-
tions of sensory deprivation and other maltreatment of prisoners in Northern Ireland.
106. STEVmE GREER, SUPERGRASSES: A STUDY IN ANTI-TERRORIST LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
NORTHERN IRELAND 32-33 (1995) (noting that some internees were denied food and sleep
and forced to stand spread-eagled against a wall for long periods of time while radio
static was played in the background).
107. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, No. 2889, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Article III provides: "No one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
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not torture.108
2. Protections for the Accused in Criminal Proceedings
In addition to imposing significant restrictions on personal liberties, the
British government has significantly curtailed the traditional procedural
protection afforded to criminal defendants. These curtailments culminated
in the establishment of special courts, known as "Diplock Courts," for the
prosecution of persons charged with certain scheduled offenses. 10 9 Since
its introduction, the Diplock Court system has been attacked by commen-
tators as inherently unfair and incapable of protecting the rights of the
accused.110 Criticism of the Diplock system has focused on two main
areas: first, the elimination of the right to a jury trial;11 and second, the
admissibility of certain questionable evidence, specifically, confessions
and uncorroborated testimony.112
In the United Kingdom an accused has the right to request a jury
trial.1 13 The British government abolished this right in cases involving
scheduled offenses, out of the fear that juries hearing these cases would be
incapable of deciding the matter in an unbiased and uninfluenced man-
ner.1 1 4 In addition, the British government believed that the jury system
should also be replaced because of the possibility of jury tampering and
intimidation.1 15 The Diplock Report cited this intimidation, stating that
"[a] frightened juror is a bad juror even though his own safety and that of
his family may not actually be at risk."1 16
Moreover, the Diplock Commission offered an additional ground for
abolishing the right to a jury trial: jury bias premised on religious differ-
ences. 117 Specifically, the Commission focused on the manner in which
criminal juries in Northern Ireland are selected.' 1 8 The Commission con-
cluded that the selection process tends to produce a jury with a dispropor-
tionate number of Protestant jurors.119 As a result, a Protestant defendant
108. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. CL. H.R. (ser. A) 66-67 (1978).
109. Dn'LocK REPORT, supra note 104, at 17-19. These courts were established after a
commission, led by Lord Diplock, recommended that new trial techniques were neces-
sary to combat terrorism.
110. United States and United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty: Hearings on
Treaty Doc. 99-8 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
121-25 (1985) (testimony of Christopher H. Pyle, Department of Politics, Mount Hol-
yoke College) [hereinafter Committee Hearings].
111. S.C. GREER & A. WHrrE, ABOLISHING THE DiPLoCK COURTS 78-80 (1986).
112. Id. at 16; Walsh supra note 34, at 46-53.
113. See BRICE DICKSON, THE LEGAL Sysrm IN NORTHERN IRELAND 98 (1989) (noting
that in all criminal cases heard in Northern Ireland's Crown Court there will be a jury of
twelve persons, except when the defendant is charged with a scheduled offense); GREE,
supra note 106, at 37.
114. DipLOcK REPORT, supra note 104, at 17-18.
115. Id. § 36. See also id. § 17 (Diplock Commission describes the effects of IRA
intimidation upon the government's prosecution of suspected terrorists).
116. Id. § 36.
117. Id. § 36.
118. Id.
119. Id. § 36.
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charged with a scheduled offense had a better chance of acquittal than his
Catholic counterpart. 120 The Commission concluded that religious and
social differences in Northern Ireland had become so divisive that selection
of an impartial jury was highly unlikely, if not impossible.121
The Commission's claim that the polarization of the jury system
required the elimination of that system has been assailed as more pretex-
tual than substantive. Several critics have asserted that the stated grounds
for abolishing jury trials were not adequately supported by fact and were
based upon uncertain and unjustifiable premises. x22 Many commentators
have asserted that judges who hear scheduled offenses lose their impartial-
ity after they become "case-hardened" by the constant stream of terrorist
offenders. 123 As proof of this phenomena, commentators have pointed to
the significant drop in acquittal rates of defendants charged with sched-
uled offenses. 124 In addition to the elimination of jury trials, the Diplock
courts also have greatly reduced the restrictions on the admissibility of
evidence in criminal proceedings. 125 This reduction has had a significant
effect on two distinct but related areas of the law: the admissibility of con-
fessions and the defendant's right to remain silent. 126
The EPA eliminated the common law requirement that a confession be
voluntary in order for it to be admissible. 127 Prior to the passage of the
EPA, confessions were inadmissible if they were coerced from a defendant
120. GREER & Winr_, supra note 111, at 44.
121. See DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 104, § 37; Brian P. Lenihan, Note, Unsound
Method: Judicial Inquiry and Extradition to Northern Ireland, 34 B.C. L. REv. 591, 614
(1993); GREER & WnrrE, supra note 111, at 42-46.
122. SeeJohn D.Jackson & Sean Doran, The Diplock Court: Time for Re-Examination,
139 NEw L.J. 464 (1989); GREER, supra note 106, at 37 n.33 (noting that subsequent
research has shown that the evidence was at best equivocal and that other options,
besides wholesale elimination of jury trials, could have been considered first).
123. See Jackson & Doran, supra note 122, at 464; Talcott, supra note 97, at 482.
124. Charles Carlton, Judging Without Consensus-The Diplock Courts in Northern Ire-
land, 3 L & POL'Y Q. 225, 234 (1981).
125. Lenihan, supra note 121, at 613.
126. See Dickson, supra note 113, at 104 (noting that the test for admissibility of a
confession in a scheduled offense has been changed by the EPA making it easier for a
coerced confession to be admitted at trial); Jackson & Doran, supra note 122, at 464
(noting the EPA's abrogation of a defendant's right to silence).
127. EPA, supra note 92, § 11. In American criminal procedure, a confession is
admissible if two criteria are satisfied. First, the confession must have been obtained
after the suspect was informed of his rights under the Miranda decision. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Second, the confession must have been made voluntarily.
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994). In the United States, the issue of voluntariness is determined
after a judge has had the opportunity to consider all the circumstances surrounding the
confession. Id. § 3501(b). These circumstances include the amount of time that
elapsed between arrest and arraignment, whether or not the defendant was advised of, or
aware of, the fact that he was not required to make a statement, and whether or not the
defendant had assistance of counsel. Id. The voluntariness standard seeks to ensure
that a confession is barred when (1) it is of questionable reliability because of the way in
which they were obtained; (2) it is believed to be reliable but obtained by offensive inter-
rogation tactics; (3) it is obtained under circumstances which impaired the defendant's
free choice, even if the police did not employ offensive interrogation tactics. WAYNE R.
LAFAvE &JERoLD H. IsRAE., CRwiNAL PRocEDuRE § 6.2(b) (2nd ed. 1992).
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(i.e., if the police used oppression or other similar tactics to procure a con-
fession). 128 The Diplock Commission believed that the voluntariness
requirement was a serious impediment to the war on terrorism. 129 The
Commission believed that the voluntariness requirement shielded terrorist
defendants from the sting of their own words and permitted them to escape
punishment. 130 Therefore, the Diplock Commission recommended aboli-
tion of the voluntariness requirement. 13 1
The 1973 EPA incorporated this suggestion. The most recent amend-
ment to the EPA retains the abolition of the voluntariness requirement.
Section 11(2) states that the confession of a person charged with a sched-
uled offense is inadmissible if "the accused was subjected to torture, to
inhuman or degrading treatment ... in order to induce him to make his
statement.. ."132 Some commentators have posited that this provision of
the EPA permits an interviewer to use a moderate amount of physical abuse
to induce a person to make a statement. 133 Although the provision has
been amended twice in an attempt to discourage violence, and threats of
violence, from being employed as interrogation techniques, the provision
still allows some involuntary confessions to be used against criminal
defendants. 134
An additional concern informing the Diplock Commission's decision
to relax the rules governing confessions was the fear that few witnesses
would come forward to assist in the prosecution of terrorism.' 35 The Com-
mission believed that confessions were frequently the only tool that the
security forces would have available in their investigation and prosecution
of terrorists because the fear of terrorist reprisals would make potential
witnesses reluctant to speak out136 As a result, the use of confessions
increasingly became a tool for combatting and prosecuting terrorists.13 7
In 1988, the British government became convinced that terrorists had
learned that refusing to cooperate with security personnel during interro-
gations was the best way to ensure that they would not incriminate them-
selves. 138 In response, the British government enacted legislation that
seriously limited the defendant's right to remain silent during interroga-
tion and at trial. The passage of Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland)
Order 1988 ensures that suspected terrorists can incriminate themselves
128. See Regina v. Cowan, 1987 N.Ir. 338, 343 (C.A.).
129. DiLOcK REPORT, supra note 104, § 73-87.
130. Id. See also Lenihan, supra note 121, at 618-19.
131. DiILocK REPORT, supra note 104, § 91.
132. EPA, supra note 92, § 11(2)(b).
133. See Talcott, supra note 97, at 483-84.
134. EPA, supra note 92, § 11(2)(b).
135. DipLOcK REPORT, supra note 104, § 17.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See David Walchomer, The Suspect's Silence and the Prima Fade Case, 139 NEw
UJ. 484, 485 (1989) (noting that increase in number of suspects exercising their right of
silence supports the implication that professional criminals are hiding behind a right
originally intended to protect "the weak and inadequate."); Lenihan, supra note 121, at
628.
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not only when they choose to speak, but also when they refrain from
speaking.' 39 The Order permits Diplock Courts to draw adverse conclu-
sions from a defendant's refusal to answer questions during his interroga-
tion, and his refusal to testify during trial. 140 In an attempt to mitigate the
harshness of this legislation, the Criminal Evidence Order imposes several
limitations on the conclusions that a judge may infer from a defendant's
silence.141 Despite these limitations, however, the practical consequence
of this order is that defendants charged with scheduled offenses in North-
ern Ireland's courts cannot assert a right to silence without jeopardizing
their defense. 142
Although the 1988 Criminal Evidence Order is significantly different
from the American position that a criminal defendant has a privilege
against self-incrimination, some commentators have asserted that the
Order is not a significant departure from the right to silence rules that
existed under English common law prior to the 1985 Order. 143 These
commentators point to the fact that under the common law of Northern
Ireland there has never been a per se rule against drawing adverse infer-
ences from a defendant's refusal to testify or to answer questions during
his interrogation. 144 Prior to 1988, however, Diplock Courts had generally
refused to draw any inferences from such silence.' 4 ' In addition, the 1988
Order authorized the Diplock Courts to go beyond the common law and to
draw negative inferences from a defendant's failure to mention some fact
during interrogation that the defendant later remembers and decides to
use as a part of his defense. 146 Thus, courts can use the Order to the detri-
ment of defendants who remain totally silent, as well as those who cooper-
ate during interrogation.
II. The Supplementary Treaty
A. Elimination of the Political Offense Exception
The United States and the United Kingdom enacted their first extradition
139. Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order, S.I. 1988, No. 1987.
140. Id. §§ 4(2), 4(6). In the United States, if after being given his Miranda warnings,
the defendant remains silent, the prosecution may not use that fact to attack the defend-
ants alibi at trial. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (holding that the prosecu-
tion's use of petitioner's silence, after arrest and after receipt of Miranda warning, for
impeachment purposes violated Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
However, in cases where the police have not given Miranda warnings, as in the case of
pre-arrest silence, the prosecution can use the defendant's silence to impeach the
defendant's testimony. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (noting that the
prosecution did not act improperly when it impeached defendant's self-defense claim by
pointing out that defendant failed, for two weeks after the murder, to turn himself in to
the authorities).
141. Criminal Evidence Order, supra note 139, §§ 2(4), 3(2)(c)(i), 4(5).
142. See Lenihan, supra note 121, at 628; Jackson & Doran, supra note 122, at 464.
143. See J.D. Jackson, Curtailing the Right of Silence: Lessons From Northern Ireland,
1991 CraM. L. R-v. 404, 405; Lenihan, supra note 121, at 630.
144. See Lenihan, supra note 121, at 630-31.
145. Lenihan, supra note 121, at 633.
146. Criminal Evidence Order, supra note 139, § 3.
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treaty in 1794, when they signed the Jay Treaty.14 7 The two nations have
amended the terms of their extradition agreement several times over the
past two hundred years, typically for the purpose of increasing the number
of extraditable offenses. 14 8 The most recent amendment occurred in 1986
when the two nations signed the Supplementary Extradition Treaty.
149
The Supplementary Treaty differed from other treaty amendments in that it
radically restricted the traditional authority of American courts to deny
extradition requests. The treaty did this by explicitly limiting the scope of
the political offense exception.' 5 0
Article V of the 1977 Extradition Treaty provided that a request for
extradition would be denied if the requested nation determined that the
offense forming the basis of the request was political in nature.15 1 This
provision, known as the political offense exception, was first codified in an
extradition treaty between the United States and France in 1843,152 and
has been a standard part of all United States extradition treaties ever
since.15 3 The political offense exception is premised on the belief that
political dissent is a legitimate means of effecting social change, and that
political dissidents should not face official governmental retaliation
because of their sufficiently political activities.' 5 4
It is generally believed that there are two types of political offenses:
pure and relative. Pure political offenses are those that are aimed directly
at a particular government or that government's representatives.15 5 Pure
political crimes include treason, sedition, and espionage.' 5 6 Relative polit-
ical offenses are merely common crimes perpetrated in furtherance of
some political or ideological objective. 5 7 Most of the problems concern-
ing extradition in political offense cases arise in connection with relative
offenses, because common crimes, unlike pure political crimes, are extra-
147. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-U.K, 8 Stat.
116, art. XXVII.
148. See Groarke, supra note 4, at 1517.
149. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 1.
150. See Groarke, supra note 4, at 1526-27.
151. Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, art. V.
152. See Groarke, supra note 4, at 1520; I.A. SHEARER, ExTRADTON IN INTEMATIONAL
LAW 167 n.5 (1971).
153. See Groarke, supra note 4, at 1520; Steven Lubet, Extradition Reform: Executive
Discretion and Judicial Participation in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 15 Commn
INT'L LJ. 247, 250 (1982).
154. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986). In his majority opinion,
Judge Reinhardt delineated three justifications for the political offense exception. First,
it is grounded in the notion that individuals have the "right to resort to political activism
to foster political change." Second, the exception reflects the view that unsuccessful
rebels should not be returned to countries where they may be subjected to unfair pun-
ishments. Finally, the exception is premised on the belief that "governments should not
intervene in the internal political struggles of other nations." Id.
155. Barbara Ann Banoff & Christopher H. Pyle, To Surrender Political Offenders: The
Political Offense Exception to Extradition in United States Law, 16 N.Y.UJ. INr'L L. & POL.
169, 178 (1984).
156. Id.
157. See id.; Groarke, supra note 4, at 1520.
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ditable offenses. 158 Thus, the courts must determine if the common crime
was done in furtherance of a political agenda, and if so, whether the indi-
vidual deserves protection. In an attempt to assist jurists in determining
how to apply the political offense exception when the underlying crime is a
common crime, three different approaches to defining the scope of the
political offense exception have developed.' 59
The first approach, developed by the French, defines political offenses
as only those crimes which threaten the state. 160 This test takes the posi-
tion that only pure political offenses deserve the protection of the political
offense exception. This "injured rights" test was first articulated in 1947 in
In re Giovanni Gatti.161 In that case, France extradited a man to the Repub-
lic of San Marino who had attempted to murder a national of that nation.
In distinguishing between relative and pure political offenses the French
court stated, inter alia, that "the fact that the reasons of sentiment which
prompted the offender to commit the offense belong to the realm of politics
does not itself create a political offense." 162 This narrow test ensures that
common criminals cannot use the political offense exception to protect
themselves from being prosecuted for their common crimes. Additionally,
the tat deviates from the goal of protecting all politically motivated actors
in that it fails to protect fugitives whose actions, though motivated by a
genuine desire for political change, do not directly harm the state. 163 The
primary advantage of this test, as opposed to the other tests, is the certainty
that it brings to the law. However, to achieve this measure of certainty, the
French courts have minimized the importance and value of the political
offense exception. Accordingly, those fugitives who truly seek political
change but whose actions are not pure political crimes find no refuge in
the French injured rights test.
A second approach, developed by the Swiss, is the "political motiva-
tion" test.16 4 This test attempts to strike a more equitable balance between
the competing values of administrative efficiency and protection of polit-
ical offenders by distinguishing them from common criminals. Swiss
courts weigh the political and common elements of a crime. Swiss courts
cannot extradite fugitives if the political elements of the crime outweigh the
common elements.' 65
British and American Courts have rejected both the Swiss and French
tests in favor of the "political incidence" test.166 This test was first articu-
158. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 155, at 178; Groarke, supra note 4, at 1520.
159. Groarke, supra note 4, at 1521.
160. Id.
161. S. Jur. 1144 (Cours d'appeal, Grenoble 1947), 14 Ann. Dig. 145 (Ct. App. Greno-
ble, Fr. 1947).
162.. S. Jur. II at 45, 14 Ann. Dig. at 145.
163. Groarke, supra note 4, at 1521.
164. See Geoffrey S. Gilbert, Terrorism and the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised,
34 IT'L & COMP. L.Q. 695, 701 (1985); Groarke, supra note 4, at 1521-22.
165. See Gilbert, supra note 164, at 701-02.
166. See Groarke, supra note 4, at 1522; Banoff & Pyle, supra note 155, at 183-84.
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lated in 1890 by the British House of Lords in In re Castioni.167 The fugi-
tive in that case was a Swiss national who had fled to England. The fugitive
had been responsible for leading an insurrection that ultimately resulted in
the death of a local government official. The House of Lords refused to
extradite Castioni on the grounds that his acts were political in nature.
The holding in that case established a two-part test. To avoid extradition,
the defendant must prove that: (1) the act was committed during an upris-
ing instigated by a group of which the defendant is a member; and (2) the
crime was a violent one whose commission was incidental to the further-
ance of a political cause.1 6 8
The United States first applied the political incidence test in 1894, in
In re Ezeta.169 Antonio Ezeta, a Salvadoran, had participated in a revolt
that had succeeded in overthrowing the previous Salvadoran government.
As the Commander-in-Chief of the new government's army, he actively par-
ticipated in the elimination of resistance and the suppression of opposi-
tion. 170 Another revolution forced him to seek refuge in the United States.
The new government requested that the United States return Ezeta to the
Republic of Salvador to stand trial for murder, robbery and other common
crimes that had occurred during the revolution and counter-revolution.' 7 1
The United States refused to extradite Ezeta.1 72 The Ezeta court applied
the political incidence test without regard to the underlying purposes for
the test.173 After mechanically applying the reasoning of In re Castioni, the
court held that offenses associated with the actual conflict of armed forces
are political in nature and thus non-extraditable. 174
In the years following In re Ezeta, subsequent U.S. courts applied the
political incidence test mechanically, whether or not the result was reason-
able. The test became a bright-line rule that ensured that any common
criminal act committed in the course of an armed revolt against a govern-
ment would be protected as if it were a political act, notwithstanding the
subjective motivation of the actor.1 75 United States ex rel. Karadzole v.
Artukovic is a good example of a case in which the test is applied in a way
that ignores the test's underlying purposes.' 76 In that case, the U.S. Dis-
167. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
168. See Groarke, supra note 4, at 1522-23; Bannoff & Pyle, supra note 155, at 183-84.
169. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
170. Id. at 977.
171. Id. at 975-76.
172. Id. at 976. The court held that the evidence of criminality, for a variety of
charges, was sufficient in law to justify Ezeta's commitment for extradition, but that the
crimes were of a political character, and therefore not extraditable.
173. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
174. Id. at 997-99.
175. See Banoff & Pyle, supra note 155, at 184; Groarke, supra note 4, at 1523 n.68
(citing Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 510-512 (1896), a case where the political offense
barred extradition of a group of civilians who, as part of an armed gang, attacked Mexi-
can soldiers, burned, looted, and stole from and murdered some of their victims).
176. 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959), rev'd, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954).
Although Karadzole was reversed by the Ninth Circuit, it nevertheless demonstrates the
way in which some courts have reached bad results through mechanical application of
the political incidence test.
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trict Court for the Southern District of California refused to extradite an
alleged war criminal, a member of the pro-Nazi regime in Croatia during
World War 11, who had participated in the mass extermination of Serbs,
because those acts occurred during, and in furtherance of, an armed strug-
gle between the Serbs and Croats.177
In recent years, the application of the political incidence test in
P.I.R.A.-related cases has resulted in outrage and condemnations in both
the United States and Great Britain. 178 In one case, In re McMullen,179 the
court refused to extradite a P.I.R.A. member sought in connection with the
bombing of a British army barracks in England. In 1981, another Ameri-
can court refused to extradite a different P.I.R.A. member wanted for the
attempted murder of a police officer in Belfast.180 Then, in 1984, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
a P.I.R.A. fugitive, who had already been convicted of the murder of a Brit-
ish soldier could not be extradited because his act was political in
nature.181
Several commentators have noted that the political incidence test is
both overinclusive and underinclusive, and that blind application of the
two-pronged test leads to ridiculous results. 182 All crimes, regardless of
the subjective motivations of the actor, committed during times of political
turmoil are exempt from extradition, while ideologically motivated crimes,
committed outside of these tumultuous periods, are totally unprotected. 183
These flaws, combined with the aforementioned cases, spurred the U.S.
and British governments into action.18 4 The Reagan Administration
drafted an amended treaty and submitted it to the Senate for approval in
1985.185 The primary difference between this treaty and its predecessor
was found in article 1, which explicitly excluded a wide variety of common
177. Id. at 392-93.
178. Committee Hearings, supra note 110, at 4-5 (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer,
Legal Adviser, United States Department of State); British M.P.'s Criticize Ruling on
Extradition, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 15, 1984, at 5.
179. Mag. No. 3-78-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
180. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
181. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
182. See supra notes 169-77 and accompanying text (examples of rigid application of
test).
183. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 155, at 186.
184. See Stuart Taylor Jr., U.S. Aide Faults Judge's I.R.A. Extradition Ruling, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 1984, at A23; Stuart Taylor Jr., Justice Department; Extradition: Hot Topic In
Crusade On Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1984, at A28; Committee Hearings, supra note
110, at 4-5.
185. Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom: Message from the Pres-
ident of the United States Transmitting the Supplementary Extradition Treaty Between the
United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
with Annex, Signed at Washington on June 25, 1985, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1985) (Letter
of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan to the Senate) [hereinafter Message from
the President]. In this message to the Senate, President Reagan stated that the amended
treaty "represents a significant step in improving law enforcement cooperation and com-
batting terrorism, by excluding from the scope of the political offense exception serious
offenses typically committed by terrorists." Id.
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crimes from the political offense exception. 186 Article 1 of the Supplemen-
tary Treaty effectively denies potential extraditees a defense to extradition
based upon the political offense exception if the individual is accused or
has been convicted of a violent crime. Thus, prior to ratification of the
Supplementary Treaty, an individual who used violence in order to effect
political change in the United Kingdom could qualify for the protections of
the political offense exception. However, after the passage of this treaty,
the individual would have no defense predicated on the political offense
exception because, under the Supplementary Treaty, violent acts which are
on the Treaty's list of excluded common crimes are no longer regarded as
an offense of a political character.
Political considerations, as opposed to substantive legal concerns,
were the driving force behind the Administration's decision to amend the
treaty. Prior to the 1986 amendments to the treaty, several federal courts
had refused to apply the political incidence test in a mechanical and irra-
tional fashion. Instead, they applied the test in a manner intended to effec-
tuate the rational underlying purpose of the political offense exception.
For example, in Eian v. Wilkes' 8 7 the Seventh Circuit upheld the deci-
sion of a federal magistrate to extradite a Palestinian terrorist to Israel. The
fugitive was accused of setting off a bomb in an Israeli marketplace that
killed two children. 18 8 The court refused to be constrained by a rigid
application of the political incidence test. While acknowledging the fact
that Eian's action was connected to an armed uprising, the court reasoned
that the bombing, because of its indiscriminate nature, was not incidental
to that armed uprising.1 8 9 The Eian court carved out a "Wanton crimes"
exception to the incidence test.190 This exception cured some of the over-
inclusiveness problems of the political incidence test. The wanton crimes
exception authorizes the extradition of a fugitive accused or convicted of
killing civilians, even if the fugitive is otherwise not extraditable under the
two-part political incidence test.19 1
In Quinn v. Robinson,192 the Ninth Circuit held that the political
offense exception to extradition was inapplicable to a P.I.R.A. fugitive
accused of conspiracy to cause explosions and murder in connection with
terrorist acts in England.193 In applying the incidence test, the court held
that, while an uprising existed in Northern Ireland at the time of Quinn's
actions, there was no such uprising in England, the place where Quinn's
politically motivated crimes occurred.194 In reversing the lower court,
which held that Quinn established a defense premised on the political
offense exception, the Ninth Circuit stated that the traditional incidence
186. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 1, at 15.
187. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.).
188. Id. at 523-24.
189. Id. at 520-21.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
193. Id. at 817-18.
194. Id. at 818.
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test is sufficient to ensure that the two primary objectives of the political
offense exception are met: (1) that international terrorists are extradited;
and (2) that domestic revolutionaries are protected.1 95 The court stated
that it was sufficient that "for purposes of the political offense exception,
an uprising cannot extend beyond the borders of the country or territory in
which a group of citizens or residents is seeking to change their particular
government "196
The Quinn court did not adopt the Seventh Circuit's wanton crimes
exception, stating that it was "inappropriate to make qualitative judgments
regarding a foreign government or a struggle designed to alter that govern-
ment."197 Instead, the court retained the traditional incidence test and
clarified its proper application. Of the test's two components, the court
noted that it was the uprising requirement, and not the "incidental to"
prong that played the pivotal role "in ensuring that the incidence test pro-
tects only those activities that the political offense doctrine was designed to
protect." 198 According to the Quinn court, an act is incidental to an upris-
ing when it is "causally or ideologically related to the uprising."199
In light of these decisions, it would seem that President Reagan's pro-
motion of the Supplemental Treaty was ill-advised and unwarranted. The
Treaty virtually eliminated the political offense exception at a time when
the federal courts were acting to eliminate mechanical and unreasonable
application of the test in an attempt to put the doctrine back on sound
theoretical footing. An executive action clarifying the proper interpretation
of the test, in view of the discrepancy between the Ninth Circuit and Sev-
enth Circuit, would have been more helpful, and less invasive, than the
chosen course of action which had the practical effect of eliminating a 150-
year-old cornerstone of American extradition law.
B. Legislative Response to the 1985 Proposal
1. The Debate in the Senate
The Supplementary Treaty met with significant resistance in the Senate
when it was first offered for advice and consent.200 In fact, the Senate
report described the Supplementary Treaty as "one of the most divisive and
contentious issues the committee on Foreign Relations [had] faced" that
term.201 The hostile reception by the Senate was caused by two aspects of
the Treaty: the virtual elimination of the political offense exception; and
the apparent unfairness of the Diplock courts in Northern Ireland.
One of the chief criticisms leveled at the proposed treaty was its over-
195. Id. at 806.
196. Id. at 807.
197. Id. at 804.
198. Id. at 806.
199. Id. at 809.
200. Lenihan, supra note 121, at 599; Kelly, supra note 49, at 354-55.
201. S. Exec. Rep. No. 99-17, at 6 (1986).
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inclusiveness. 20 2 The treaty, as proposed, exempted all violent acts from
the protection of the political offense exception.20 3 Critics argued that by
placing all violent acts beyond the protection of the political offense excep-
tion, the draft treaty denied the legitimacy of armed conflict as a means of
effectuating political change. 204 In addition, critics believed that the draft
treaty set a bad precedent. Some commentators posited that this treaty
would be the first step in a long march toward eliminating the political
offense exception in all bilateral U.S. extradition treaties. 20 5 Senator Jesse
Helms of North Carolina noted that, if this happened, "freedom fighters" as
well as anti-government forces fighting against oppressive and totalitarian
regimes could be wrongly denied safe harbor in the United States. 20 6
Another widespread concern within the Senate was that the President
was abandoning the political offense exception, an important element of
every American extradition treaty since 1843, for the sole purpose of fur-
thering foreign policy objectives. Some Senators were outraged that the
Reagan Administration would propose a new treaty as a means of doing
what could not otherwise be done legally, namely returning political pris-
oners to governments that the prisoners had been unsuccessfully fight-
ing.207 One member of Congress argued that the draft treaty was an
attempt on the part of the British to force the United States to relinquish its
neutrality and to explicitly support British rule in Northern Ireland.20 8
One commentator argued that the Reagan administration's proposed treaty
eliminated the political offense exception as a way of thanking the British
government for its support of the 1986 raid on Libya. 209
Still other criticism centered on the perceived unfairness of Northern
Ireland's justice system. Some senators felt that the United States should
not return persons to stand trial before, or complete criminal sentences
already meted out by, a judicial system like the Diplock court system.210
As a result, some senators openly expressed their intentions to delay the
202. See Committee Hearings, supra note 110, at 228 (statement of Arthur Helton);
Committee Hearings, supra note 110 at 231 (statement of David Carliner).
203. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 1, at 15.
204. 132 CONG. REc. 16,600-02 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Helms) (noting that the
amended treaty makes no distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters).
205. See Phyllis Jo Baunach, The U.S.-U.IC Supplementary Extradition Treaty: Justice
for Terrorists or Terror for Justice?, 2 CONN. J. Iwr'L L. 463, 484.
206. 132 CONG. REC. 16,600-01 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Helms).
207. See Committee Hearings, supra note 110, at 13-14 (statement of Senator Joseph
Biden); Baunach, supra note 205, at 476 (noting that the treaty was "an effort to more
narrowly circumscribe the political offense exception on a bilateral basis").
208. Mario Biaggi, A Treaty That Would Belie U.S. Neutrality on Northern Ireland, N.Y.
TImEs, Aug. 22, 1985, at A22. The author was, at the time of this article, a Congressman
representing New York's Nineteenth District in addition to serving as chairman of the ad
hoc Congressional Committee for Irish Affairs. See also Committee Hearings, supra note
110, at 49.
209. Kelly, supra note 49, at 357-62. The author notes that after British Prime Minis-
ter Margaret Thatcher permitted American warplanes to use British bases in the Libyan
raid, British and American sources adopted the view that the Supplemental Treaty
should be passed as a way of demonstrating U.S. appreciation for Britain's support.
210. 132 CONG. REc. 16,592-93 (1986) (remarks of Sen. D'Amato).
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ratification process and to use it as a forum for criticizing the British gov-
ernment's actions in Northern Ireland.21
2. Compromise in the Senate: Adoption of Article 3(a) and the Rule of
Partial Inquiry
In response to the widespread dissatisfaction with the treaty as originally
proposed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee proposed a compro-
mise treaty. On July 17, the full Senate approved the compromise treaty by
a vote of 87-10.212 As part of the compromise treaty, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee inserted the new article 3(a), in addition to some
other changes that would benefit potential extraditees. 213 Article 3(a)
provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplementary Treaty, extradi-
tion shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of the
competent judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the
request for extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish
him on account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, or
that he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished,
detained or restricted in his liberty by reason of his race, religion, national-
ity or political opinions. 214
Article 3(a) authorizes a court to deny extradition in two circumstances.
The first circumstance is where the requesting state has "trumped up"
charges against a fugitive.215 The second circumstance involves cases
where a fugitive would be unfairly treated at his trial or, upon his return to
the country seeking extradition, would be punished or restricted in his lib-
erty because of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions. 216 To
ascertain if either of these defenses applies, article 3(a) replaces the tradi-
tional rule of non-inquiry with a rule of partial inquiry.217 This rule of
partial inquiry grants the fugitive the right to demonstrate that, as an indi-
vidual, he would be prejudiced upon return because of discrimination
within the requesting nation's criminal justice system. 218
The alteration of the rule of non-inquiry has spurred a great deal of
211. Committee Hearings, supra note 110, at 13-14.
212. See 132 CONG. REc. 16,819 (1986); Edward Walsh, U.S.-British Extradition Pact
Ratified, WASH. PosT, July 18, 1986, at A4.
213. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 1, at 16.
214. Id.
215. Smyth, supra note 7, at 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
216. Id.
217. Lenihan, supra note 121, at 600-01; Groarke, supra note 4, at 1530-31. The tradi-
tional rule of non-inquiry is premised on the belief that the United States only enters
into extradition treaties with nations that will treat extraditees fairly. Glucksman v.
Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911). Thus, American courts have refused to inquire into
the treatment that a potential extraditee will suffer upon return to the requesting nation.
Article 3(a) altered the rule of non-inquiry by expressly authorizing American courts to
inquire into the treatment that a potential extraditee will face upon return to Northern
Ireland.
218. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
rev'd 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
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debate regarding its proper application. 219 According to the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, it is clear that the second clause of article 3(a)
provides P.I.R.A. fugitives with a defense against extradition based on the
unfairness of the Diplock court system.220 What is not clear is the proper
scope of inquiry permitted under article 3(a).
During the congressional debate on the Supplementary Treaty three
interpretations of the scope of inquiry permitted by article 3(a) were
offered. Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri argued that the scope of
article 3(a) was very narrow and that it limited judicial inquiry to particular
facets of the Diplock Court system that would deny the individual opposing
extradition a fair trial.221 Under Senator Eagleton's view, American courts
do not have the power to inquire into the inherent fairness or unfairness of
a particular judicial system in the abstract.222 A court will deny extradition
only when it determines that, in light of the particular circumstances of the
case, the judicial system of the requesting country is "so unfair as to violate
fundamental notions of due process." 223
Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts argued for a broader interpreta-
tion of article 3(a).2 24 He argued that the scope of inquiry permits a fugi-
tive to base a defense to extradition on the inherent unfairness of the
Diplock system, and the assertion that Catholic republicans in Northern
Ireland accused of terrorism cannot receive a fair trial in that system.2 2 5
Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware also favored this interpretation.226
Since 1986 several commentators have endeavored to define the scope
of the article 3(a) inquiry.227 The predominant view on the issue can be
found in a colloquy inserted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
into the Executive Report accompanying the Supplementary Treaty.228
This interpretation is a compromise of sorts in that it is not as broad as
Senator Kerry's but is more expansive than Senator Eagleton's. The collo-
quy set forth the majority view, and the view of the amendment's principal
sponsor, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, that the inquiry should not be
limited to the procedures employed at trial.229 However, it seems apparent
219. Id. at 1150 (noting that the permissible scope of inquiry under Article 3(a) has
been the source of considerable debate).
220. 132 CONG. REc. 16,798 (1986); S. ExEc. REP. No. 99-17, at 5 (1986).
221. 132 CONG. REc. 16,605-07 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Thomas Eagleton) (noting
that article 3(a) "has [a] narrow and focused scope... [it] is not intended to give courts
authority generally to critique the abstract fairness of foreign judicial systems.").
222. Id.
223. Id. at 16,607.
224. Id. at 16,798-803 (remarks of Sen. John Kerry).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 16,798.
227. Talcott, supra note 97, at 491 (arguing that article 3(a) authorizes American
courts to consider Northern Ireland's judicial system in future extradition requests);
Lenihan, supra note 121, at 635 (asserting that American courts should not interpret
article 3(a) as authorizing a "generalized inquiry" into the inherent fairness of Northern
Ireland's judicial system when deciding future extradition requests).
228. S. ExEc. RP. No. 99-17, at 4-5 (1986).
229. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 715 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g
denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
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from the language of article 3(a) and the text of this colloquy that the
inquiry permitted under article 3(a) is individual and case specific. 230
C. Judicial Interpretation of Article 3(a)
The Northern District of California was the first American court to deter-
mine whether article 3(a) afforded any protection to P.I.RLA. fugitives. 231
However, the Northern District was not the first U.S. court to discuss the
implications of article 3(a). Several other federal courts, including the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, addressed the issue in dicta, and
one court dealt with the issue in the context of a non-P.I.R.A. member.
In McMullen v. United States,232 the Second Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's holding that application of the Supplementary Treaty to Peter
McMullen, a P.I.R.A. fugitive who had successfully asserted the political
offense exception as a defense to extradition, was an unlawful bill of attain-
der.233 In reaching this conclusion, the court addressed some of the impli-
cations of the article 3(a) defense. In particular, the appeals court asserted
that article 3(a) "does not appear to provide the same judicial safeguards as
the 'political offense' exception."234
Only one fugitive, a non-P.I.R.A. member, asserted an article 3(a)
defense prior to James Smyth.235 In In re Extradition of Howard, the
defendant was an African-American man accused of murder. British
authorities wanted him extradited so that he could stand trial. At the extra-
dition hearing, Howard did not dispute the existence of probable cause, a
requirement for extradition. Instead, he argued that he would be unfairly
prejudiced at his trial because of his nationality and race, and because of
the inordinate amount of media coverage surrounding the case. 23 6 In
1991, a U.S. Magistrate for the District Court of Massachusetts held that
230. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
rev'd 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996) (noting that the fugitive is granted the limited "right to
establish that he himself would be prejudiced as a result of discriminatory treatment
within the requesting country's criminal justice system").
231. Id. at 1137.
232. McMullen v. United States, 953 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1992).
233. Id at 769. The court noted that Article I, § 9, cl. 3 of the Constitution provides
that "[n]o Bill of Attainder. . . shall be passed." Id. at 764. The court then defined a bill
of attainder as "a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an
identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial." Id. at 764
(quoting Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S.
841, 846-47 (1984)).
234. Id. at 768. The appeals court cited approvingly to the following statement of
Senator Eagleton:
It would be a ludicrous reading of the Supplementary Treaty as a whole to con-
clude that the United States and the United Kingdom went to enormous pains to
eliminate the political offense defense... [and] then undid it all in article 3(a)
by creating a huge new loophole by which terrorists could seek protracted sanc-
tuary in the United States.
Id.
235. In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320 (1st Cir. 1993).
236. Id. at 1323-24.
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article 3(a) did not prevent the extradition of Howard.237 In making this
determination, the magistrate made some observations about the article
3(a) defense. Specifically, the magistrate noted that to avoid extradition
the fugitive must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he had
been prejudiced, or would be prejudiced, by the unfairness of the foreign
judicial system.238 Furthermore, the magistrate asserted that a fugitive
could not meet his burden merely by enumerating the differences between
the Diplock court system and the United States Courts. 2 39
The district court affirmed the magistrate's order.240 However, the
district court judge did not address the soundness of the magistrate's inter-
pretation of article 3(a).241 Howard appealed the district court's decision
and the First Circuit re-affirmed the magistrate's order.242 The First Cir-
cuit endorsed the magistrate's interpretation of article 3(a) when it stated
that the magistrate correctly construed the provision to "require a showing
of actual respondent-specific prejudice."243 With regard to the scope of
the inquiry authorized by article 3(a), the court stated that "Congress
intended the words to authorize inquiry into the attributes of a country's
justice system as that system would apply to a given individual." 244 The
court summarized its position by stating that to avail himself of an article
3(a) defense a fugitive must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the requesting country would treat him differently from other simi-
larly situated individuals because of his race, religion, nationality, or polit-
ical affiliations. 245
III. Applying the Supplementary Treaty to James Smyth's Case
A. Application of the Treaty by the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California
Although there had been considerable legislative and judicial interpreta-
237. United States v. Howard, Mag.No. 91-0468L-01 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16729 *56 (D.
Mass. Nov. 18, 1991).
238. Id.
239. Id. at *39.
240. In re Extradition of Howard, 791 F. Supp. 31,35 (D. Mass. 1992), affd, 996 F.2d
1320 (1st Cir. 1993).
241. In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1329 (1st Cir. 1993). The First
Circuit noted that the lower court did not review the magistrate's interpretation of the
treaty because it believed that interpretation of the treaty was a fact question, and not a
legal question. The First Circuit noted that interpretation of the treaty was a legal ques-
tion that was capable of being scrutinized by a higher court. The First Circuit decided to
resolve the legal question rather than remand.
242. Id. at 1333.
243. Id. at 1332.
244. Id. at 1330. This language seems to endorse the magistrate's position that a
fugitive cannot establish a meritorious article 3(a) defense merely by outlining the inade-
quacies of the Diplock court system. At the very least, the fugitive must show that these
inadequacies, as they are applied to him individually, will be unfairly prejudicial.
245. Id. at 1331. "It is not enough simply to show some possibility that some per-
formed ideas might exist; rather, under the terms of the Supplementary Treaty, the bias
must rise to the level of prejudicing the accused."
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tion of article 3(a) prior to the case of James Smyth,2 46 no P.I.R.A. member
had ever asserted a defense to extradition based on this provision of the
Supplementary Treaty. 24 7 Thus, many of the issues raised in the Smyth
case were questions of first impression.
Prior to ruling on the applicability of Smyth's Article 3(a) defense,
Judge Caulfield carefully outlined the various facts of Smyth's life in North-
ern Ireland that she considered relevant to ascertaining the merits of his
claim.2 48 Judge Caulfield noted that Smyth was Catholic, a republican,
and a member of Sinn Fein.249 Caulfield also noted that in the years pre-
ceding his conviction for attempted murder, Smyth was the constant target
of police harassment. 250 Despite his frequent contact with the security
forces, Smyth was not charged with a crime until 1978, when he was
charged with, and subsequently convicted of, the attempted murder of
John Carlisle, an off-duty prison guard.
In addition to outlining the facts of Smyth's life, Judge Caulfield made
several inquiries regarding England's efforts to control the violence in
Northern Ireland. Specifically, she examined the problems associated with
the presence of British troops in Northern Ireland and with the Irish prison
system.251 The United Kingdom refused'to cooperate with some aspects of
this discovery process. Although the court determined that several docu-
ments were relevant for discovery purposes, the United Kingdom refused to
produce documents regarding governmental inquiries into past indiscre-
tions on the part of security personnel.25 2 The United Kingdom premised
its refusal on alternative grounds: (1) that the documents were not relevant
to the inquiry; and (2) that the documents were protected by the state
secrets privilege, deliberate process privilege, and investigatory files privi-
lege. 253 The district court found that the documents were relevant and
246. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
rev'd 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
247. Id. at 1150 (noting that the question of whether article 3(a) may prevent the
extradition of an alleged I.R.A. fugitive is a question of first impression).
248. Id. at 1147-48.
249. Id. at 1147.
250. Id. at 1148. The court noted that the evidence established that Smyth had been
arrested and detained by the police dozens of times before his arrest for attempted mur-
der. During those detentions he was beaten and physically abused. He spent the entire
year of 1974 in detention. In addition, evidence was presented establishing the fact that
security personnel frequently searched Smyth's home, despite the fact that nothing
criminal was ever found. Id.
251. Id. at 1140-47.
252. Id. at 1138-39. Smyth sought to compel the British government to release several
documents that chronicled illegal and discriminatory practices perpetrated by the secur-
ity forces in Northern Ireland. The Stalker-Sampson Reports documented an investiga-
tion of certain members of the security forces relating to the shooting deaths of six
persons believed to be P.I.R.A. members. Id. at 1138. The Kelly Report was commis-
sioned to determine if criminal charges should be brought against security personnel
implicated in murder and other crimes by the Stalker-Sampson Report. Id. The Stevens
Inquiry investigated charges of collusion between members of the security forces and
loyalist paramilitaries. Id.
253. Id. at 1139.
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were otherwise discoverable. The United Kingdom, however, refused to
produce the documents. In response to this refusal, the court granted the
following rebuttable presumptions to Smyth: "(1) Catholic Irish nationals
accused or found guilty of offenses against members of the security forces
or prison officials are subjected systematically to retaliatory harm, physical
intimidation and death in Northern Ireland[;] (2) Members of the security
forces in Northern Ireland either participate directly or tacitly endorse
these actions."254
In trying to determine the appropriateness of an article 3(a) defense,
Judge Caulfield looked to U.S. immigration law regarding withholding of
deportation. 255 She believed that certain aspects of that law, specifically 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h), would provide a helpful and useful analogy to article
3(a).25 6 Both Smyth and the U.K. agreed.2 57 Under this statute, the gov-
ernment will not deport an individual if that individual can prove that
upon his return, his life or freedom will be endangered on account of his
race, religion, nationality or political opinion. 25 8 Because the protections
afforded by article 3(a) and § 1253(h) were very similar, Judge Caulfield
believed that the regulations implementing the withholding of deportation
statute provided useful guidance for evaluating evidence and determining
if the statutory requirements of article 3(a) had been met.25 9 Under
§ 1253(h), once an individual establishes that he has been the victim of
past persecution in his homeland, a presumption arises that the person's
life would be threatened upon return to that country.2 60 The burden then
shifts to the U.S. government to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that sufficient changes have occurred within the potential deportee's home-
land to ensure that the potential deportee's life would no longer be jeopard-
ized by a forced return. 261 Further, the regulation mandates that the
potential deportee need not provide evidence that he individually would be
singled out for such persecution. 262 A person can also avoid deportation if
he establishes that he is a member of a group that is systematically perse-
254. Id.
255. See infra Part 1V.B.
256. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
rev'd 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
257. Id. at 1151, n.11.
258. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1987). The statute specifically states that "The Attorney
General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General
determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or polit-
ical opinion." Id. See supra note 6 to compare this language with the similarly drafted
article 3(a) of the Supplementary Treaty.
259. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b) (1997). This regulation enunciates eligibility requirements
for individuals seeking to avoid deportation under authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
Since the language of this statute and article 3(a) of the Supplementary Treaty are so
similar, it is logical that the regulations implementing 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) would be
equally applicable to article 3(a).
260. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2) (1997).
261. Id.
262. Id.
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cuted.263 If the individual establishes that he is identified with, or
included in, that persecuted group, and that it is more likely than not that
his life will be threatened upon return, he does not need to offer proof of
individual harm.26 4
Judge Caulfield's extensive findings of fact, the presumptions awarded
to Smyth, and the analogy of 1253(h) to article 3(a) in interpreting the
latter formed the basis of her decision to deny the United Kingdom's
request to certify Smyth for extradition. Judge Caulfield stated that Smyth
would be punished and restricted in his personal liberty "by reason of his
status as a Catholic Irish national and on account of his political opinions
as a republican and member of Sinn Fein."265 After considering the evi-
dence regarding events that occurred when Smyth was in Northern Ireland,
the state of affairs there at that time, and the likelihood of change in the
future, Judge Caulfield held that Smyth had established an article 3(a)
defense to extradition.266
The court supported its holding in three ways. First, the United King-
dom did not rebut the presumption that Smyth would face retaliatory pun-
ishment and harm upon his return to Northern Ireland.267 Second, Smyth
had established, without use of the presumption, that he would be perse-
cuted on account of his religious and political beliefs punished upon his
return to prison in Northern Ireland.268 Finally, Smyth established that he
would be punished, detained and restricted in his personal liberties upon
his release from prison.269
B. Application of the Treaty by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit
The government immediately appealed the district court's decision.
According to the appellant, the district court erred in three respects: (1) it
misinterpreted the terms of the treaty when it inquired into Smyth's likely
post-incarceration treatment; (2) in awarding Smyth evidentiary presump-
tions; and (3) the evidence presented was insufficient to support the dis-
trict court's findings and conclusions. 270  After considering the
government's appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
263. Id. § 208.16(b)(3) (1997).
264. Id.
265. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
rev'd 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. The court stated that the past mistreatment of Smyth, prior to his arrest for
attempted murder, "is a harbinger of things to come if Mr. Smyth returns to the streets of
Northern Ireland." Id. at 1154. The court then noted that the likelihood that Smyth
would be harassed and targeted by the security forces after release from prison was
greater in the future than it was in the past, primarily because in the future he will be
deemed an actual, rather than a suspected, terrorist. Id. at 1155.
270. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 718-719 (9th Cir. 1995),
reh'g denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
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cuit reversed and remanded the matter for entry of an order authorizing
extradition. 271
In response to the government's first ground for appeal, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the district court was correct in recognizing that the Supple-
mentary Treaty authorizes courts to examine the treatment an extraditee
might possibly suffer at the hands of the criminal justice system after extra-
dition.272 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion
that it is possible for punishment "to extend beyond the jalhouse door."273
According to the Ninth Circuit, this is especially true in Northern Ireland,
particularly where evidence had been presented at trial showing that
prison guards provided information to Loyalist forces concerning the time
and place of the release of republican prisoners. 274 The Ninth Circuit
noted that if a fugitive demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that he will likely be the target of such misconduct following his release,
then that person is entitled to protection under the terms of article 3(a).
2 75
In response to the government's second ground for appeal, the Ninth
Circuit discussed the implications of the presumptions awarded to Smyth.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the presumptions granted to Smyth by the
lower court as both a sanction for the United Kingdom's refusal to provide
requested documents and as a remedy for Smyth's inability to obtain nec-
essary evidence, were insufficient to establish the critical elements of the
article 3(a) defense.276 While the presumptions effectively established that
Smyth would be the target of retaliation if the United States returned him
to Northern Ireland, they did not address the issue of whether the pre-
sumed retaliation would be inflicted because of Smyth's race, religion,
nationality or political opinions, as required by article 3(a).2 77 The panel
asserted that article 3(a) does not authorize denial of extradition in cases
where the extraditee will be targeted for retaliation as a result of the under-
lying crime. 278 Thus, the unrebutted presumptions established only that
Smyth would be subject to retaliation and harm. The court held that the
mere fact that Smyth would be subject to such harm upon his return, with-
out a showing that this harm was the direct result of his political opinions,
religion or nationality, was insufficient gound for an Article 3(a)
defense.279 The court asserted that to qualify for the defense, the defend-
ant must establish the crucial link between the extralegal harm to be sus-
tained and the fact that such harm would be inflicted for reasons forbidden
by article 3(a), rather than merely on account of his underlying crime. 280
271. Id. at 722.
272. Id. at 719.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 720-21.
277. Id. at 721.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 720.
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The government's final ground for appeal challenged the sufficiency of
the evidence presented to support Smyth's claim that he would be harmed
after being released from jail.28 1 On this issue, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the district court erred in at least two respects. First, the cir-
cuit court held that the district court's resort to the withholding of
deportation statute, which presumes a present danger of persecution from
past persecution, cannot validate a presumption that Smyth will be at risk
in the future.282 Second, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court
should not have relied to the extent that it did upon the evidence of dis-
crimination in Northern Ireland against Catholics and republicans gener-
ally.28 3 The Ninth Circuit noted that the evidence regarding the treatment
of Catholics generally does not necessarily relate to the treatment that
Smyth would be likely to receive after his release from prison. In sum, the
Ninth Circuit held that the evidence did not establish that Smyth would
suffer retaliatory harm as a result of his religious or political views. 28 4
IV. Deficiencies in the Ninth Circuit's Interpretation of Article 3(a)
OnJanuary 5, 1996, a panel of judges from the Ninth Circuit voted to deny
Smyth's petition for a rehearing and his suggestion for rehearing en
banc.2 85 OnJune 24, 1996, the Supreme Court denied Smyth's petition for
writ of certiorari.286 On August 18, 1996 Smyth was extradited to North-
em Ireland after U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher signed the
extradition order.287
Although James Smyth has already been returned to Northern Ireland,
and the Supreme Court has tacitly endorsed the Ninth Circuit's interpreta-
tion of article 3(a), it remains important to highlight the deficiencies in the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of article 3(a). The Ninth Circuit erred in
three ways: (1) in holding that the district court erroneously relied on evi-
dence of the type of harm extradited P.I.R.A. fugitives in general faced upon
return to Northern Ireland rather than relying upon evidence that Smyth as
an individual would suffer retaliatory harm from forbidden discrimination
upon his return to Northern Ireland; (2) in rejecting § 1253(h), the with-
holding of deportation statute, as an analog to article 3(a); and (3) in hold-
ing that the presumptions awarded by the district court were insufficient to
establish an article 3(a) defense to extradition.
A. The District Court Did Not Rely Solely on General Evidence
Since the Supplementary Treaty was enacted in 1986, most courts that have
discussed the scope of the inquiry authorized by article 3(a) have asserted
281. Id. at 718-19.
282. Id. at 720.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
116 S. CL 2258 (1996).
286. Smyth v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2558 (1996).
287. Fugitive Returned to Northern Ireland, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 19, 1996, at A13.
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that the provision authorizes a focused inquiry into Northern Ireland's
judicial system. This is consistent with the majority view expressed by Sen-
ator Lugar in the Senate's debate of the treaty.288 In light of this view and
of the underlying intent of the Supplementary Treaty to facilitate the extra-
dition of P.I.R.A. members found in the United States,289 the court of
appeals was authorized by article 3(a) to engage in a focused inquiry.290
However, the court of appeals narrowed the scope of permissible inquiry
too much. The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the district court failed
to make sufficient findings of fact specific to Smyth merely because it
relied on some general evidence of discrimination against Catholics in the
judicial system of Northern Ireland.291
The Ninth Circuit was correct in asserting that "Article 3(a) does not
permit denial of extradition on the basis of an inquiry into the general
political conditions extant in Northern Ireland."2 92 However, in applying
this focused inquiry, the Ninth Circuit was wrong to conclude that the dis-
trict court failed to engage in an individualized inquiry simply because the
lower court highlighted some relevant evidence of the mistreatment of
other Catholic republicans in Northern Ireland.
When district court Judge Caulfield concluded that James Smyth
would, upon his return to Northern Ireland, likely suffer extralegal harms
for forbidden reasons, she supported her holding with extensive evidence
related specifically to James Smyth.293 The district court found that prior
to being convicted of attempted murder in 1979, Smyth had been the fre-
quent target of police harassment. 294 Specifically, the court found that
prior to 1979 Smyth had been arrested and detained by the police dozens
of times, despite the fact that he was never actually charged with commis-
sion of a criminal act until he was charged with the attempted murder of
John Carlisle.29 ' The court also noted that after being arrested Smyth was
often detained for long periods of time, after which he would return home
with bruises and marks indicating that he had been physically abused.296
Furthermore, the court noted that Smyth had been detained for the entire
288. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
289. Message from the President, supra note 185.
290. The First Circuit noted that Congress intended the provision to authorize the
court to inquire into the attributes of Northern Ireland's justice system as that system
would affect a given individual. In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1330 (1st
Cir. 1993).
291. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 72 F.3d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996) (dissenting opinion).
292. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 720 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g
denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996) (dissenting
opinion). The court also noted that the history of article 3(a) establishes the fact that it
requires an individualized inquiry.
293. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
rev'd 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
294. Id. at 1148.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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year of 1974 without being charged with any criminal activity.2 9 7 The dis-
trict court weighed all this evidence and stated, "the frequent law enforce-
ment contact with Mr. Smyth-not leading to the filing of charges-leads to
the conclusion that Mr. Smyth was targeted for attention not because he
had committed crimes but instead because he was a member of Sinn Fein
and a republican."29 8
Judge Caulfield did not rely solely on this strong evidence of individ-
ual political and religious discrimination against Smyth prior to his convic-
tion in 1979. She also found evidence of forbidden religious and political
discrimination against Smyth while he was in prison. Specifically, Judge
Caulfield stated that after being incarcerated, "Smyth was treated worse
than other prisoners because of the political nature of his crime." 299
Smyth received an explicit death threat shortly after arriving at prison.30 0
Furthermore, he also received implicit death threats from a prison
official. 3 0 '
After considering the abundance of evidence of forbidden discrimina-
tion endured by Smyth as an individual, both before and after his convic-
tion in 1979, it is difficult to comprehend how the Ninth Circuit could find
that "the district court erred in relying extensively upon evidence of the
general discriminatory effects of the Diplock system upon Catholics and
suspected republican sympathizers."30 2 It is true that the thorough opin-
ion of the district court analyzed many of the discriminatory features of the
justice system in Northern Ireland, including the pattern of discriminatory
practices exhibited by prison officials and security personnel. However,
these general findings of discriminatory practices in no way detract from
the strength of the aforementioned evidence of discrimination against
Smyth. Rather, this general evidence should be seen as supplementing the
individual evidence and creating a context in which the individual mis-
treatment of James Smyth can be understood. Courts should not inquire
into the specific discrimination of one individual in Northern Ireland in a
vacuum, as the Ninth Circuit seems to suggest. Rather, they should look at
the totality of the extant conditions. Presentation and assessment of gen-
eral evidence of discrimination can establish a general context within
which the evidence of individual discrimination can be better understood
and appreciated. This is not to suggest that a fugitive can support a valid
article 3(a) defense to extradition without showing how he individually
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1153.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1146. The court noted that prison officer Evans told Smyth that he could
not guarantee Smyth's safety because of the political nature of his crime. The court
asserted that the threatening nature of the statement is clear, because Smyth had no
reason to fear that other republican prisoners would harm him because of his political
crime. Thus, the only persons that would be apt to threaten Smyth's safety would be the
prison guards themselves.
302. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 720 (9th Cir. 1995), rehg
denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
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will be harmed or by merely presenting evidence of general discrimination
in Northern Ireland.303 It does, however, suggest that in cases such as
Smyth's, where the fugitive has presented a plethora of evidence indicating
individual, religious and political discrimination, the presentation of gen-
eral discriminatory treatment in Northern Ireland, as a supplement to that
individual evidence, should not be dismissed wholesale and certainly
should not be used by a reviewing court to nullify the findings of the lower
court's individualized inquiry.
B. Justifying the Use of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) and Its Implementing
Regulations as an Analog to Article 3(a)
Withholding of deportation forbids the return of an individual to a nation
in which he or she would be subject to certain types of persecution. This
procedure is required by Article 33 of the U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, which is binding upon the United States because of our
adherence to the U.N. Protocol on the same issue.30 4 This remedy is codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) which provides that, "the Attorney General shall
not deport or return any alien... to a country if the Attorney General
determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such
country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group or political opinion."30 5
To establish a defense to deportation premised upon § 1253(h), the
individual must prove a "dear probability of persecution."30 6 In INS v.
Stevic,30 7 the Supreme Court held that this standard requires an applicant
to prove that it is more likely than not that he or she would be subject to
persecution "on account of" one of the five factors enumerated in the stat-
ute.30 8 In § 1253(h) claims, courts have held that a showing of persecu-
tion "on account of" one of the five enumerated factors demands that the
applicant establish mistreatment by the government or a particular organi-
zation.30 9 Furthermore, this harm must go beyond the general harms asso-
ciated with civil unrest and periods of strife.310 In the context of
persecution on account of political opinion, the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) has held that an applicant must establish that
303. See In re Requested Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320 (1st Cir. 1993). The
court noted that "Congress intended the words to authorize inquiry into the attributes of
a country's justice system as that system would apply to a given individual." Id. at 1330.
The court later stated that the provision required "a showing of actual respondent-spe-
cific prejudice." Id. at 1332.
304. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. The United States did not originally accede to the
1951 Convention. However, the United States has since acceded to the Convention after
the adoption of a protocol in 1968. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
305. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
306. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 424.
309. Matter of T-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 571, 575 (BIA 1992).
310. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (BIA 1985).
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the particular belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in an
individual must be his political opinion. Thus, [it] refers not to the ultimate
political end that may be served by persecution, but to the belief held by an
individual that causes him to be the object of the persecution. 3 11
Once an individual meets this burden, the relief authorized by the statute is
mandatory and withholding of deportation must be granted. 3 12
The INS regulation implementing the withholding of deportation stat-
ute is 8 C.F.R. § 208.16. Eligibility for withholding of deportation is set
forth in § 208.16(b). Judicial interpretation of the requirements for with-
holding of deportation has established that the applicant for withholding
of deportation will carry his burden only by proving a "clear probability of
persecution."3 13 In addition, § 208.16(b) provides standards for evaluat-
ing the evidence.3 14 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1) provides that the applicant
establishes a valid claim under § 1253(h) if the court finds that it is more
likely than not that the applicant "would be persecuted on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion."3 15 Sub-section (b)(2) provides that
if an individual establishes that he or she suffered past persecution on
account of one of the impermissible factors, then it shall be presumed that
his or her life would be threatened on return to that country unless a pre-
ponderance of the evidence establishes that conditions in the country have
changed such that it is no longer more likely than not that the individual
would be so persecuted there.3 16
Finally, sub-section (b)(3) provides that
the finder of fact shall not require the applicant to provide evidence that he
would be singled out for persecution if he establishes two things: (1) that
there is a pattern and practice of persecution of groups of persons similarly
situated to the applicant for impermissible reasons in the country of deporta-
tion; and (2) the individual establishes his own inclusion in and identifica-
tion with such group such that it is more likely than not that his life or
freedom would be punished upon his return. 3 17
In concluding that Smyth would be impermissibly punished upon his
return to prison in Northern Ireland and upon his release into the general
population, Judge Caulfield analogized the language ot article 3(a) to 8
311. Id. at 234-35.
312. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1987); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 444 (1987).
313. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 422 (1984). The court noted that to qualify for
withholding of deportation an applicant must establish that he "would" be threatened in
the country to which he would be deported to. The court highlighted the fact that the
use of the term "would" as opposed to "could" or "might" evinces the intent of the legis-
lature that a likelihood of persecution must exist to qualify the alien for withholding of
deportation. Id.
314. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b) (1997).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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U.S.C. § 1253(h).318 In addition, Judge Caulfield asserted that the regula-
tions implementing the withholding of deportation statute provided a use-
ful standard for evaluating evidence.3 19 Under 8 C.F.R § 208.16(b)(2), a
showing of past persecution creates a presumption that the individual's life
or freedom will be threatened upon return to the country unless a prepon-
derance of the evidence establishes that conditions in that country have
sufficiently improved.320 Judge Caulfield noted that in establishing that
his life or freedom will be threatened upon return to his home land, the
individual need not provide that he or she would individually be targeted
for persecution if he or she established two facts: (1) there is a pattern and
practice in the country of persecution of groups of protected persons simi-
larly situated to the individual; and (2) he or she establishes his or her
inclusion in that group such that it is more likely than not that his life or
freedom would be threatened upon his or her return. 321
After setting forth this analogy, Judge Caulfield applied it to the facts
of Smyth's article 3(a) defense. Judge Caulfield held that it was more likely
than not that Smyth had established that he would be impermissibly pun-
ished upon his return to prison in Northern Ireland.322 Specifically, after
applying the provisions of 8 C.F.R § 208.16(2), the court found that
Smyth's past treatment at the hands of prison personnel established that
he would likely face the same harm upon his return to prison.323 Further-
more, after applying 8 C.F.R § 208.16(3), the court found that the inappro-
priate treatment of other persons similarly situated to Smyth established
that it was more likely than not that his life and freedom would be
threatened upon his return to prison.324
Judge Caulfield also used this analogy to determine that Smyth's likely
post-incarceration treatment further established a defense to extradi-
tion.325 Specifically, after applying § 208.16(b)(2), the court held that
"[tihe past mistreatment of Mr. Smyth is a harbinger of things to come if
Mr. Smyth returns to the streets of Northern Ireland."326 In addition, the
court noted that the mistreatment of individuals similarly situated to James
Smyth created a presumption that he too would be punished after serving
the remaining years of his prison sentence. 327
The Ninth Circuit rejected Judge Caulfield's use 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)
to interpret article 3(a). The panel asserted that the use of § 208.16(b) did
318. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
rev'd 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S. CL 2258 (1996).
319. Id.
320. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (1997).
321. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(3) (1997).
322. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
rev'd 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1153, 1154.
325. Id. at 1154.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 1155.
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not establish that Smyth would be persecuted for religious or political
grounds upon his post-incarceration release into the general population of
Northern Ireland.328 The Ninth Circuit held that the district court's reli-
ance upon § 208.16(b) was erroneous for two reasons. First, the appeals
court held that the withholding of deportation statute presumes a present
danger of persecution from past experience of persecution. 329 Therefore,
the statute cannot validate the district court's presumption of a risk of per-
secution in the future.330 Second, the appeals court found that the district
court erroneously relied upon evidence of the general discriminatory
effects of Northern Ireland's justice system upon Catholics and Sinn Fein
supporters.331
However, the issues raised by the Ninth Circuit are not serious impedi-
ments to the use of §1253(h) as an analog to article 3(a).
1. 8 C.FR. § 208.16(b)(2) Presumes a Present and Not a Future Danger
of Persecution
The Ninth Circuit held that 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2) could not be used to
support the district court's finding that Smyth would be punished upon his
post-incarceration release into the general population of Northern Ire-
land.332 The panel reached this conclusion by stating that evidence of past
persecution of an individual, or a "pattern and practice" of persecution of
persons similarly situated to that individual, presumes a present danger of
persecution, not that such persecution is likely to occur in the future.333
This argument is flawed because it fails to recognize that drawing
inferences from past conduct to predict future behavior is a common
method of reasoning in our system of justice.334 Furthermore, inference-
drawing, the process by which the presence of one fact leads to a probable
estimate of a second fact, is an often-practiced tool for fact-finding.335
Therefore, the fact that § 208.16(b)(2) does not explicitly authorize a pre-
sumption of future harm to be drawn from evidence of past persecution is
not a serious impediment to the use of § 208.16(b)(2) to evaluate evidence
presented to support an article 3(a) defense to extradition.
328. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 720 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g
denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 72 F.3d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1996) (dis-
senting opinion), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996). Judge Noonan stated that the
Supreme Court expressly noted in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275-76 (1976), that
predicting future events by analyzing past experiences is performed countless times
each day in U.S. courts.
335. Id.
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2. Article 3(a) Requires an Individual Inquiry
The Ninth Circuit's attack of the district court's use of generalized evidence
to support an article 3(a) defense to extradition poses a more significant
problem to the use of § 208.16 in the evaluation of evidence in extradition
cases. As noted above, article 3(a) requires a fugitive to establish that he or
she would individually be subject to persecution if returned to Great Brit-
ain.3 36 Thus, a court could not use generalized evidence of persecution of
persons similarly situated to the fugitive to establish a meritorious article
3(a) defense to extradition. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(3), however, provides
that an individual seeking a remedy under § 1253(h) can use just that type
of evidence. Specifically, § 208.16(b)(3) states that:
In evaluating whether the applicant has sustained the burden of proving that
his life or freedom would be threatened in a particular country on account of
his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion, [the adjudicator] shall not require the applicant to provide
evidence that he would be singled out individually for such persecution.3 3 7
Despite the discrepancy between the scope of inquiry authorized
under article 3(a) and § 208.16(b)(3), the regulations implementing
§ 1253(h) can still serve as a useful tool in evaluating evidence presented
in support of an article 3(a) defense. Specifically, it is important to note
that § 208.16(b)(2) does not authorize the use of general evidence of perse-
cution.3 38 Rather, this subsection authorizes a court to award a presump-
tion of persecution if "the applicant is determined to have suffered
persecution in the past such that his life or freedom was threatened in the
proposed country of deportation" on account of one or more of the enu-
merated factors.3 39 Thus, in applying the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 208.16
to evaluate evidence in the context of extradition proceedings, courts
should apply subsection (b)(2) instead of (b)(3). Therefore, the district
court was wrong to use 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(3) to validate Smyth's article
3(a) defense. However, this fact should not detract from the district court's
use of 8 C.F.IR § 208.16(b)(2) to validate Smyth's article 3(a) defense.
The withholding of deportation statute and regulations implementing
that statute provide an excellent standard for evaluating evidence
presented in support of an article 3(a) defense to extradition. Since no
regulations exist to guide courts in applying the remedy afforded under
article 3(a), the regulations implementing 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) should have
been used by the Court of Appeals in Smyth's case. Furthermore, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h) should be used in future extradition cases where an individual
asserts an article 3(a) defense to extradition because the burdens of proof
are identical and the protections afforded by both remedies are so similar.
An individual seeking a remedy under § 1253(h) must establish a
clear probability of persecution on account of his or her race, religion,
336. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
337. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(3) (1997).
338. 8 C.F.RL § 208.16(b)(2) (1997).
339. Id.
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nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ions.340 Similarly, an individual seeking a remedy under article 3(a) must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she will be subject
to persecution on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, or polit-
ical opinions.341 Thus, the burden of proof that an individual must carry
to establish a valid defense to extradition under article 3(a) is the same
burden of proof required to establish persecution under § 1253(h).
The only difference between the protections afforded by these two pro-
visions is that § 1253(h) protects membership in a particular social group,
whereas article 3(a) does not. However, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) and article 3(a)
both provide identical protection to persons persecuted on account of race,
religion, nationality and political opinion. Since article 3(a) is relatively
new and scarcely used, there has been little judicial interpretation of what
constitutes punishment "on account of [an individual's] race, religion,
nationality, or political opinions." Therefore, it is only logical that courts
interpreting this provision look to the manner in which courts have defined
persecution "on account of race, religion, nationality. .. or political opin-
ion" in the context of § 1253(h) claims.
In light of the great similarities between 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) and article
3(a), it is obvious that courts should look to § 1253(h) when applying arti-
cle 3(a). Since § 1253(h) has been the subject of more judicial interpreta-
tion than the scarcely used article 3(a), courts interpreting the latter
provision can benefit from these interpretations. In addition, since there
are no regulations interpreting the language of article 3(a), courts should
seek guidance from the regulations that have been drafted to assist courts
facing withholding of deportation requests. As noted above, not all of the
regulations interpreting § 1253(h) are perfectly applicable to article
3(a).3 42 However, this is no reason to foreclose courts from employing the
applicable provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 208.16, namely subsection (b)(2), in
future extradition cases when an article 3(a) defense to extradition is
asserted.
C. The Discovery Presumptions Awarded to Smyth Were Sufficient to
Establish an Article 3(a) Defense to Extradition
During the district court proceedings, the United Kingdom failed to coop-
erate with certain discovery requests. In response, the district court
awarded Smyth two rebuttable presumptions shifting the burden of pro-
duction onto the United Kingdom. 343 The Ninth Circuit held that these
presumptions established that Smyth would be subject to retribution upon
return to Northern Ireland, but that the presumptions failed to establish
that this punishment would be on account of the four forbidden factors.344
340. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984).
341. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 1, at 16.
342. See supra notes 328-31 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 252-54.
344. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 721 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g
denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
Vol. 30
1997 Compromise Between Outrage and Compassion
Furthermore, the panel held that the district court improperly shifted the
burden of proof from Smyth to the United Kingdom "in contravention of
the treaty provision."345
The Ninth Circuit's assertion that the presumptions awarded to Smyth
failed to address the proper elements of article 3(a) has been attacked as
"just plain wrong, and inexplicably so."346 Although the district court
might have been clearer in drafting the presumptions, the unambiguous
import of these presumptions is that Catholic Irish republicans are sub-
jected to harm and retaliation as a result of their race, religion, nationality
and political views.347 Judge Reinhardt argued that any reading contrary
to this "amounts to a flagrant disregard of its clear meaning as well as an
unwarranted insistence on pedantry."348 He went even further to argue
that, following the majority's approach, "the statement, 'under Hider, Jews
in Germany were systematically subjected to enslavement and execution,'
would not mean thatJews were persecuted on account of their religion."349
The Ninth Circuit's demands of precision can be used to subvert even the
clearest of statements. For example, in concluding its decision, the panel
stated, "[W]e conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support a find-
ing that Smyth would face mistreatment in prison on account of his polit-
ical or religious beliefs."350 Holding the Ninth Circuit to its own rigorous
standards, a court deciding a 3(a) extradition issue after Smyth could assert
that this statement does not sufficiently determine whether or not James
Smyth has made a valid article 3(a) defense because that court has not
determined whether or not Smyth would face mistreatment in prison
because of his race or nationality. Such a ruling would, of course, miss the
clear meaning of the Ninth Circuit's statement, just as the Ninth Circuit
missed the unambiguous import of the presumptions awarded to Smyth.
The Ninth Circuit has also been criticized for holding that the district
court improperly shifted the burden of proof from Smyth to the govern-
ment.351 According to rule thirty-seven of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, a district court may take "appropriate actions" against a party that
fails to comply with the court's discovery orders.352 In Henry v. Gill Indus-
tries, Inc.,353 the court held that dismissal of a case was an appropriate
sanction. Since the treaty neither explicitly nor implicitly infringes on the
right of the district court to enforce its orders by appropriate sanctions, it
appears that the Ninth Circuit's holding that the district court lacked the
345. Id.
346. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 72 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996) (dis-
senting opinion), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 1439.
349. Id.
350. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 722 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g
denied, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
351. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 72 F.3d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1996) (dis-
senting opinion), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
352. FED. R. CIrv. P. 37.
353. Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 1993).
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authority to award rebuttable presumptions as a discovery sanction contra-
venes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.35 4
Conclusion
It is imperative to reiterate that it has not been my intention to determine
the validity of James Smyth's article 3(a) defense to extradition. Such a
fact-intensive determination must be made within a courthouse, not within
the pages of a law journal. However, the Ninth Circuit's flawed interpreta-
tion of article 3(a) does not comport with legislative intent, prior judicial
interpretation of article 3(a), or with the similarly worded 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h). As a result of this flawed interpretation, James Smyth was
denied a full opportunity to properly present his article 3(a) defense to
extradition. Future courts facing article 3(a) defenses to extradition should
be careful to avoid repeating these mistakes. Although it is too late for
James Smyth to benefit from a better interpretation of article 3(a), other
U.S. courts should consider the mistakes of the Ninth Circuit before
blindly following the precedent set by Smyth.
354. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 72 F.3d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1996) (dis-
senting opinion), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2258 (1996).
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